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The Strategic Arms Package, otherwise commonly known as the Arms Deal, has been 
the largest public controversy of South Africa's post-Apartheid era. Opposition 
parties and civil society have severely criticised the SAP. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to understand what the Arms Deal shows about legislative control over 
defence in a democratic South Africa, and also the impact it has had on security 
relations. 
This dissertation takes the form of a critical analysis and attempts to provide a 
balanced assessment of what exactly has transpired during the history of the Arms 
Deal. Through the 'window' of the Arms Deal the study will attempt to highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses of South Africa's democratic institutions and other relevant 
role players. The study addresses four main criticisms of the Arms Deal. These 
include: ftrst, the necessity of the Arms Deal; second, the affordability of the Arms 
Deal; third, the allegations of corruption within the Arms Deal; and fourth, whether 
the Arms Deal has relegated Parliament as a rubber stamp body. 
The dissertation's main ftndings are related to democratic civil-military relations and 
democratic legislative control over the military. Executive dominance over the 
legislature is a phenomenon present in democracies around the world. Executive 
dominance is a tradition from the Apartheid era that has continued. Another tradition 
that has continued from the Apartheid era is weak oversight over the military within 
the South African Parliament. Also, South Africa's democratic institutions are 
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1.1 Motivation and Research Problem 
Democracy always implicitly presumes unlimited civilian supremacy over the 
command of the armed forces anything short of that defines an incomplete 
democracy. I 
1 
In 1999 the South African government entered into a strategic arms acquisition deal 
with a price tag of over R29 billion. The Strategic Arms Package (SAP), otherwise 
commonly known as the Arms Deal, has been the largest public controversy of South 
Africa's post-Apartheid era. Opposition parties and civil society have severely 
criticised the SAP. This criticism ranges from the affordability of the SAP to the 
necessity of the acquisition itself; best known for the incessant allegations of 
corruption that have encircled the SAP since the outset and that continue to be made 
public. 
The Arms Deal2 is important for several reasons. The sheer cost of the SAP is 
staggering compared to any arms procurement in South Africa's history. The Arms 
Deal is South Africa's first attempt at a strategic arms procurement package. The SAP 
is also South Africa's first strategic arms procurement under a form of legislative 
civilian control, characterised by democratic security relations. Never have 
democratic security relations existed in South Africa, nor has there ever been a strong 
legislative control over defence. Both exist, from an institutional point of view, in 
post-Apartheid South Africa. Thus, the SAP is a useful window through which to gaze 
at these things. The SAP is the test of the state of legislative control over defence and 
the nature of security relations in democratic South Africa. 
South Africa underwent a process of democratisation in the early 1990s that 
culminated in its first democratic elections in 1994. Ever since, the country's political 
leaders have faced the very difficult task of transforming the Apartheid-era defence 
I Hans Born, "Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: What does it meanT' in Working Paper 
Series-No.9, (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], April 2(02), 1. 
Accessed on 2110512005 at http://www.dcaf.chlpublicationslWorking Papersl09(E).pdf 
2 The terms Arms Deal and Strategic Arms Package will be used interchangeably, but both refer to the 











sector into one that is 'democracy friendly'. Legislative control over the military has 
been of paramount importance to the success of South Africa's democratic transition. 
Thus, the Arms Deal provides a timely opportunity to examine the key characteristics 
of this new democratic defence sector and describe the nature of the relations between 
the relevant security actors. 
1.2 What is the Strategic Arms Package? 
The SAP is a series of major arms procurement contracts signed between the South 
African government and international arms suppliers. The contracts were lumped 
together into a 'package~ intended to provide a more affordable deal for the 
government. The SAP was mostly financed through an intricate set of loans from 
foreign banks. 
In December 1999, the government announced that it had signed agreements with 
various suppliers to re-equip the SANDF, with the South African Navy (SAN) and the 
South African Air Force (SAAF) being the chief beneficiaries of the SAP.3 The SAP 
consisted of five main contracts. First, the German Submarine Consortium CGSC) was 
awarded the contract to supply four submarines to the SAN at the price of R4 289 
million. Second, the Italian company Agusta was awarded the right to supply 30 
utility helicopters to the SAAF for Rl 532 million. Third, the lead-in fighter trainer or 
commonly known as "LIFf" contract was awarded to British Aerospace to provide 
the SAAF with 24 Hawk fighter/trainer jets at the price of R3 728 million.4 Fourth, 
the contract for four corvettes was awarded to the German Frigate Consortium-
Thomson (GFCT) for R5 473 million. Fifth, the advanced light fighter aircraft or 
ALF A contract was granted to British Aerospace to supply 28 SAAB5 Gripen fighters 
at the price of R9 952 million.6 The decision has since come under fierce criticism by 
3 Judith February, "South Africa- Democracy and the South African Arms Deal," in Three Strikes 
against Graft commissioned case study for the ISS Anti-Corruption Strategies Programme, (Indaba 
Hotel, Gauteng, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 15-17 March 2004), 9. 
4 The Hawk was chosen against the preference of the Secretary of Defence and the Chiefs of the 
SAAF, as the government was keen to grant a major contract to the British arms company. See Terry 
Crawford-Browne, "ECAAR-SA will Release BAE Systems Arms Deal Loan Agreements," 
Economists Allied/or Arms Reduction. (2 December 2004),1. 
5 Note that British Aerospace (BAE) has half a share in the Swedish SAAB company. 











all quarters of South African society, and one could call it the biggest controversy in 
the post-Apartheid era. 
1.3 Research Question and Focus 
Given the importance, significance and incessant controversy that surround the Arms 
Deal it is important to first get the facts right before one proceeds with any evaluative 
or causal analysis. This has been very difficult given the swarm of media activity 
around the deal. Few weeks pass without media reports of Arms Deal 
corruption/scandal. Thus, the SAP has created much noise over the past several years, 
but how much of it is actually of any substance? What is fact and what is fiction? The 
sheer scope and scale of the Arms Deal has ensured a widespread impact on South 
Africa's political landscape and greater society. 
The purpose here is to understand what the Arms Deal shows about legislative control 
over defence in a democratic South Africa, and also the impact it has had on security 
relations. The research question for this study is: "What does the Strategic Arms 
Package saga, between 1998 and 2005, show about legislative control over defence in 
South Africa?" This is a descriptive question and was chosen because it is the most 
viable means of understanding the role played by all the actors concerned. 
1.4 Research Design and Analytical Approach 
Because this is a critical analysis, it requires a balanced assessment of what exactly 
has transpired during the history of the SAP. Through the 'window' of the Arms Deal 
the study will attempt to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa's 
institutions and other relevant role players. These aspects are crucial to a balanced 
critical analysis. Given the widespread impact of the SAP it is impossible to include 
everything. There have also been many court cases related to the SAP, but some 
remain uncompleted or have not yet convened. Thus, the study will only include legal 
actions that have been completed with legal verdicts. The scope of the study stretches 
from the Apartheid era until the present year, 2006. 
The study consists of four chapters, excluding the introduction and conclusion. The 
chapters are divided according to the four main criticisms of the SAP: 
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b) The affordability of the SAP 
c) The allegations of corruption 
d) Parliament as a 'rubber stamp' body. 
All chapters include brief introductions and summaries. The summaries are crucial to 
the main conclusion as these will highlight the important strengths and weaknesses 
relevant to the subject material of the chapter concerned. 
Chapter Two is a brief historical survey of arms deals in South Africa. Although the 
dissertation does not take the form of a time comparison it is important to illustrate the 
continuities, if any, between arms deals under Apartheid and those under the post-
Apartheid democracy, with a view to legislative control over the military. 
Chapter Three surveys the roles and responsibilities of the relevant players within 
legislative control over arms acquisition in a post-Apartheid, democratic South Africa. 
Chapter Four is the first chapter that deals with the actual SAP. The chapter addresses 
the roots of the SAP and considers the criticisms of military necessity and 
affordability that have been levelled against the SAP. 
Chapter Five discusses the impact of the SAP on South Africa's democratic 
institutions. The chapter concerns the legal prosecutions and the massive political 
fallout that transpired in the aftermath of the SAP. The chapter also addresses the 
criticisms of corruption within the SAP and that the SAP has rendered Parliament a 











1.5.1 What is legislative control over the military? 
"War is a much too serious matter to be entrusted to the military". Former French 
Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. 7 
5 
Clemenceau's statement reminds us that in a democracy it is the elected 
representatives of the people who hold the supreme power and that all sectors of the 
state should be under their control. The task of controlling the military is split 
between the legislature and the executive. In most liberal democracies the executive is 
the management branch of government, which is tasked with implementing state 
policy and pursuing the objectives set by the legislature. Parliament has three 
functions: to produce legislation, to approve state expenditure and to exercise 
oversight over the executive in the execution of its functions. The responsibility of 
executive control and micro-managing the military lies with the executive. This 
includes the drawing up of budgets, the recruitment of personnel, the purchase of 
suitable equipment, training and overall strategy. Parliament must respect the 
executive's prerogative to manage the military.s 
Although not involved in the day-to-day management of the military, Parliament 
should still retain much power over the executive and the military. The legislature's 
control over the military consists of the following several items. Firstly, Parliament is 
considered as sovereign and has the responsibility to approve all policy and 
legislation regarding defence brought before it by the executive. Secondly, only 
Parliament can authorise a national state of emergency and/or make a declaration of 
war.9 Thirdly, it decides whether to employ the military abroad. Fourthly, it must 
ratify all international agreements on security and defence policy. Fifthly, it retains 
some kind of power that allows it to remove the relevant minister or government 
itself. Sixthly, Parliament has the role of authorising and scrutinising any expenditure 
7 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Parliamentary oversight of the 
Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices, ed. Hans Born, Anders lohnsson and Phillipp 
Flurl, (Geneva: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2(03),19. Accessed on 27/052005 at 
http://www.dcaf.chlhandbook:! 
8 Ibid. 7. 
9 Len Le Roux, "Challenges for Defence Management in Africa" in Guarding the Guardians, ed. Len 
Le Roux and Martin Rupiya, (Tshwane: Institute for Securty Studies, 2004), 88. Accessed on 











relating to defence. Seventhly, Parliament decides whether to, and which, arms to 
procure for the military.lO 
Of these seven mechanisms of legislature control over the military, Parliament's 
control of the budget can be the most effective. As mentioned previously, the military 
consumes a substantial portion of the state's budget and if the national budget is in the 
hands of Parliament, then this ensures that Parliament is able to wield considerable 
power over the military. Of course this is only until the money is actually handed over 
to the military to be spent. Parliament's inability to micro-manage the military, 
especially with regards to its expenditure, results in a loss of power to the executive. 
Thus, Parliament's second function of oversight over the executive is paramount to 
ensure that the executive, as well as the military, are accountable for their actions. 
Of its three functions, Parliament's most important function is to exercise oversight 
over the executive. Parliament monitors the executive because the executive is 
charged with direct management over the military. Oversight over the military is 
exercised through the executive. Legislative oversight over the military is not a goal 
in itself; the point is to hold the executive accountable and to ensure that a balance 
exists between society and the military. Parliament's function is to ensure that the 
goals of society and the goals of the military are aligned. 1 1 
Many mechanisms exist in order for Parliament to exercise its powers of oversight. 
Firstly, Parliament can question the executive on their actions and intentions. 
Secondly, Parliament can request think tanks, universities and expert private persons 
to research any area regarding the executive and its duties with regards to defence. 
Thirdly, Parliament can make public any legislation proposed by the executive with 
regards to defence. Fourthly, parliamentarians can visit military bases and units. 
Fifthly, Parliament should have the power to appoint special inquiries or 
commissions. I2 What is crucial is that Parliament discharges this function in a robust 
10 Peter Feaver, "Civil- military relations", in Annual Review of Political Sciences, (1999, No.2), 211-
241. 
11 Hans Born, Representative Democracy and the Role of Parliaments: An Inventory of Democracy 
Assistance Programmes, ( International Security Network), 5. Accessed on 25/0512005 at 
http://www.isn.ethz.chl5isf/5IPapers/Born paper IV -2.pdf. 











manner, as it is predominantly a reactive function. Often the executive and the 
military will present Parliament with a fait accompli, expecting little resistance and if 
this is so, then oversight begins to mean very little. 
Legislative control consists of control over defence legislation, the budget, arms 
procurement and force employment. Parliament sets all the rules for defence and has 
the final say. However, this means very little if not backed up with robust oversight 
over the executive and the military. Thus, in addition to having authorisation over 
defence, Parliament should also exercise robust oversight.13 But what is the 
importance of Parliament exercising oversight over defence? 
Democratic legislative control over the military requires parliamentary oversight over 
arms procurement or acquisitions. Parliamentary oversight is crucial to ensure the 
legality of proposed arms procurement with regards to international treaties and 
protocols. Parliamentary oversight is essential to ensure that the proposed acquisition 
falls within the ambit of the national security policy and/or defence strategy. Arms 
procurement can place great financial strain on the country in the short and long run, 
thus Parliament is needed to balance the cost of the arms against the needs of the 
social sector. Oversight also enables Parliament to ensure that the proposed arms 
procurement not be of such a scale as to result in a regional arms race. 14 Transparency 
is vital as the public is often sceptical towards the allocation of tax funds for the 
acquisition of arms, and thus Parliament is a great source of legitimacy. Greater 
transparency also prevents corruption, fraud and the abuse of tax funds. IS 
1.5.2 Defence Expenditure 
1.5.2.1 MILEX 
Military expenditure or MILEX refers to expenditure on the day-to-day running costs 
of the Department of Defence. This includes the payment of personnel to the 
maintenance of all military property. In short, it is expenditure on items that are 
already in the inventory of a military. 
13 DACF, l. 
14 Ibid. 163. 











1.5.2.2 Arms Research, Development and Production 
This expenditure refers to funds set aside for the research, development and 
production of armaments and military equipment destined for either procurement by 
the domestic military or sales to a foreign military. 
1.5.2.3 Arms Acquisition 
This refers to routine expenditure on the acquisition of equipment for the military.16 
This expenditure is usually the responsibility of the Chief Accounting Officer of the 
relevant Defence Department and falls under the political control of the head of the 
relevant government department, in this case the Minister of Defence. This 
expenditure can include any maintenance and/or procurement of defence systems that 
are of a non-cardinal nature. This could otherwise be known as routine expenditure 
that would not raise too many eyebrows if each acquisition were looked at 
individually. Though, often levels of arms acquisition can be extremely high if looked 
at over a financial year. The levels of arms acquisitions under the Apartheid regime 
are useful examples of such high expenditure. 
1.5.2.4 Strategic Arms Acquisition 
Strategic Arms Acquisitions differ significantly from routine arms purchases in that 
they are very rare and very expensive 'once-off' acquisitions. This significance is 
supported by the fact that such expenditure is the responsibility of a country's 
executive and, ideally, legislative branches of government. This is non-routine 
expenditure where a series of arms acquisition programmes are 'packaged' into one 
cardinal expenditure programme. Such acquisition usually occurs when states wish to 
modernise and rearm their defence forces on a large scale. The Strategic Arms 
Package in South Africa is thus an example of such defence expenditure. Thus, given 
the infrequency such high defence expenditure, this invariably attracts much attention 
from the opposition and civil society. 
16 Acquisition here refers to any and all actions taken in satisfying the need for military material, 
facilities and/or logistics, whereas procurement is a narrower concept referring to the actual contracting 
for the satisfaction of any of these requirements. This can include procurement planning, request for 












2. HISTORY OF ARMS DEALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a brief historical survey of arms deals in South Africa. Although the 
dissertation does not take the form of a time comparison it is important to illustrate the 
continuities, if any, between arms deals under Apartheid and under the post-Apartheid 
democracy with a view to legislative control over the military. 
This is a brief survey of the history of arms acquisitions in South Africa, both before 
the mandatory United Nations arms embargo of 1977 and under the sanctions-era that 
succeeded it The chapter will address the question of legislative control over arms 
acquisitions during the Apartheid-era. The purpose of the chapter is threefold. First, 
the chapter aims to describe the development of the local arms industry in the pre-
sanctions era and its rapid expansion under the arms embargo, eventually culminating 
with its decline in the early 1990s. Second, the chapter seeks to map the changing 
security environment in South Africa during this period, as these processes influenced 
the design, structure and importance of the defence sector, with varying effects on the 
'defence family' and arms acquisitions. Third, the nature of arms acquisition under 
the arms embargo era of the 1980s was characterised by a lack of transparency, covert 
dealings and much secrecy. Understanding this aspect is important to grasping the 
importance of the Strategic Arms Package, which will be dealt with in Chapters Four 
and Five. 
The chapter is split into two parts. The fIrst part deals with the period 1945-1977 prior 
to the mandatory UN arms embargo. The second part of the chapter deals with the 
period 1978-1994 following the mandatory UN embargo. 
2.2 Before the United Nations Arms Embargo (1945-1977) 
2.2.1 Before the Republic (pre-1961) 
The Union Defence Force (UDF), a product of the establishment of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910, was the predecessor of the South African Defence Force 
(SADF).17 As stipulated by the Defence Act, which was ratifIed by Parliament in 
17 Noel Stott, "From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better life for all?" in 











1912, the UDF fell under the political supremacy of the South African Parliament. 
However, South Africa still remained under the Imperial Crown and thus its military 
could be involved in Imperial wars such as the First and Second World Wars. 
However, the South African Parliament could determine the extent of this 
involvement, and also retained sovereignty over matters relating to the defence of 
South African territory. IS 
The Department of Defence (DOD), headed by a civilian, administered the UDF. 
Military spending was very low and the military officer corps attributed this to the 
presence of civilians in the upper echelons of the DOD. 19 The Defence Act prescribed 
that the Secretary of Defence was the head of the department and its chief accounting 
officer. In the early years its armament needs were very minimal, and consequently 
South Africa had not yet developed an arms production capability. All arms 
procurement was sourced externally with parliamentary approval. The advent of the 
Second World War and industrialisation changed this. These twin forces created a 
quasi-arms industry.2o The industry remained relatively small until its rapid expansion 
in the 1970s. The military in South Africa, prior to the 1960s, was a relatively small 
force with a corresponding small defence budget. Politically, Parliament was supreme, 
and military spending was not a priority amongst legislators or their constituencies?1 
The rise to prominence of the Nationalist party, coupled with internal resistance and 
Cold War geo-politics, would reverse this trend. 
In 1949 the Defence Resources Board was appointed to investigate South Africa's 
industrial capacity for armaments production. It provided this service until 1966. The 
Lyttleton Engineering Works was later established in 1953 to deal with manufacturing 
of munitions and other items. It would later be replaced by the Armaments Production 
Board in 1964, after the passing of the Armaments Act, Act No. 87 of that same 
year.22 The Defence Production Board, established in 1951, acted as a liaison between 
18 Annette Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modem South Africa, (London: Tauris, 1996), 20. 
19 Seegers, 55. 
20 Rialize Ferreira and Ian Liebenberg, "Civil-military relations and arms procurement in South Africa: 
1994-2002," in Society in Transition 2004, 35(1), 61. 











the DOD and the private sector. The Board played an advisory role to the DOD with 
regards to arms procurement and development of a domestic arms industrial base. 
Very little expansion took place during these years, as the South African defence 
industry was in its infancy. South Africa was wholly reliant on Britain as a defence 
partner and a source of military hardware.23 Government preferred to break free from 
this dependency as 'the winds of change' continued to sweep through Southern 
Africa. Momentum came with the massacre at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960. The 
ensuing brutal repression by the Nationalist government would attract the ire of the 
world. The massacre initiated an international lobby for the imposition of an arms 
embargo on all exports to South Africa?4 
2.2.2 Early Expansion of the Defence Industry (1961-1968) 
The emergence of racial Nationalist Party policies, coupled with the international 
condemnation of the Sharpeville massacre, led South Africa t wards independence 
from Britain. The Republic of South Africa was declared in May of 1961. Pretoria 
believed that it needed to develop military self-sufficiency since it severed its close 
military ties with Britain.25 Government decided that military expenditure would have 
to be increased, especially armaments. Pretoria attempted to block the 'winds of 
change' through increased investment in defence. South Africa wished to preserve its 
military dominance in the Southern Africa region and maintain control over South 
West Africa?6 
The Constitution of 1961 did not establish the SADF, nor did it enact mechanisms of 
democratic civilian control over defence. The Defence Act of 1957 founded the South 
African Defence Force and was the military's blueprint until well into the 1990s?7 
22 James McWilliams. ARMSCOR: South Africa's Anns Merchant, (New York: Brassey's, 1990), 5. 
23 Agostinho Zacarias, The South African Defence Industry and the New Thinking on Security, 
(Johannesburg: The South African Institute ofInternational Affairs, 1998),2. 
24 McWilliams, 11. 
25 Ibid. 10. 
26 Ibid. 11. 
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The 1961 Constitution failed to establish any parliamentary committee system that 
would ensure any effective oversight over the executive?S 
The 1966 Verster Commission, established to investigate the re-organisation of the 
DOD, recommended that the Chief of the Defence Force replace the Secretary of 
Defence as the head and chief accounting officer of the DOD. To make matters worse, 
or less democratic, the Minister of Defence was removed from the chain of command 
and relegated to matters concerning strictly defence policy. Effectively, the Chief of 
the SADF would report directly to Cabinet. The Commission stated three reasons for 
this move. First, it cited a lack of expertise and suitable advisors to both the Secretary 
and Minister of Defence. Second, it claimed that civilians could not understand the 
complexity of modem war. Third, the Secretariat of Defence was a waste of scarce 
resources.29 These moves signalled the end of Parliament's supremacy over matters of 
defence. Though executive political control would continue, n  civilian influence 
existed over the military. Civilians would until the 1990s play a minor role as 
administrative support personneL 30 
However, this period was not only characterised by the decline of Parliament's 
influence. The fallout of the massacre at Sharpeville in 1961 resulted in international 
condemnation of the Nationalist government's Apartheid policies and its repression of 
the disenfranchised.3l The UN responded with a voluntary arms embargo against 
South Africa in 1963, supported by Britain in 1964?2 The 'voluntary arms embargo' 
under Security Council Resolution 182 was unanimously approved by the UN 
Security Council (UNSC). Notably, France and Britain ensured that 'defensive 
weapons' were not included in the Resolution'S definition of banned arms. This rider 
28 James Ngculu, "Parliament and Defence Oversight: the South African experience," in African 
Security Review Vol 10 No.1, 2001, l. 
29 Lekoa Mollo, "Negotiating for Civilian Control: Strategy and tactics of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) 
in the democratic transition of South Africa," MA Thesis at United States Navy Postgraduate School, 
(2000), 16. 
30 Jakkie Cilliers and Lindy Heinecken, "South Africa: Emerging from a Time Warp," in Charles 
Moskos, John Williams and David Segal (eds), The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold 
War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 251. 
31 By disenfranchised I refer to those race groups classified at the time as "non-European." 
32 Peter Batchelor; Paul Dunne and Guy Lamb, ''The Demand for Military Spending in South Africa," 











was of twin importance. Britain and France were South Africa's main arms suppliers 
and this trade was lucrative for both Permanent Five powers. More importantly, it 
created a loophole that arms traders and South Africa could exploit to continue arms 
shipments under the euphemism 'defensive weapons.'33 Britain remained South 
Africa's main source of armaments, though Government took a strategic decision to 
pursue self-sufficiency in arms procurement. 34 
The Armaments Production Board (APB) was established in 1964 as a division of the 
DOD. It was charged with invigorating the defence industry. During this time only ten 
percent of arms were procured domestically. 35 The Nationalist government 
established the APB in order to be more efficient in arms procurement. Responsibility 
needed to lie with an institution outside the civil service structure unlike the Defence 
Production Board. Thus, the new Armaments Production Board coordinated all 
manufacturing, procurement and supply of armament to the SADF. 36 
By 1965, the Apartheid state had become self-sufficient in the production of small 
calibre weapons and ammunition. By this time, 120 manufacturing licenses were 
issued to domestic arms companies. However, larger hardware, including helicopters 
and heavy artillery, continued to be purchased from overseas contractors, notably of 
French, Italian and Israeli origin.37 The Atlas Aircraft Corporation began 
manufacturing the Italian Impala jet fighter under licence in 1967.38 Throughout the 
1960s South Africa's arms industry allowed a weapons pile-up and gradual 
expansion. The South African arms industry took off and soon became a major 
industrial force. Many countries continued to provide South Mrica with arms, 
technical expertise and licences to enable domestic production despite the voluntary 
arms embargo.39 
33 Isebill Gruhn, British Arms Sales to South Africa: The Limits of African Diplomacy, (Denver: 
University of Denver, 1972),4. 
34 Seegers, 144. 
35 Ferreira and Liebenberg, 65. 
36 Zacarias, 3. 
37 Ibid. 3. 











2.2.3 The Rise of ARMSCOR (1968-1977) 
The Armaments Development and Production Act of 1968 established the Armaments 
Corporation (ARMSCOR) as a statutory corporation or parastatal. ARMSCOR was 
charged with all procurement and acquisition of arms for the SADF. ARMS COR was 
a response to the UNSC call that all states cease arms shipments to a then pariah 
South Africa. As pressure mounted on arms traders by the international community, 
South Africa's arms supply lines began to dry up fast. ARMSCOR was given 
statutory powers to manufacture, develop, supply and standardise all armaments for 
the use of the SADF. State armament subsidiaries were placed under its control and it 
was also responsible for controlling the private sector. Additionally, the acquisition of 
manufacturing licenses, suppliers and co-production projects was earmarked as a 
major function within ARMSCOR's ambit of responsibility.4o 
ARMSCOR entered into contracts with third party contractors, as well as initiating 
production through its own subsidiaries. ARMSCOR was given authority to develop 
the arms industry with little constraint from the state's bureaucracy.41 ARMSCOR 
was charged with the entire production of armaments, including research and 
development, servicing of parts and repairs/overhauls. More importantly, ARMSCOR 
assumed responsibility for the procurement and acquisition of arms from both local 
and international arms companies.42 By the mid-1970s, the Nationalist government's 
investment in ARMSCOR had resulted in a thriving arms industry. The Special 
Account of the SADF, which was not subject to any oversight by Parliament, did 
much to increase local arms production.43 
39 Ibid. 17. 
40 Zacarias, 3. 
41 David Botha, "South Africa's Defence Industry: Charting a New Course?" in ISS Occasional Paper 
78, September 2003, 1. 
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2.3 Under the United Nations Arms Embargo (1978-1994) 
2.3.1 The Emergence of Total Strategy (1978-1989) 
"[ want to repeat today that South Africa can no longer be isolated by arms boycotts. 
We are absolutely self-sufficient regarding internal demands. ,,44 
15 
This statement was made to Parliament on 26 April 1972 by the then Minister of 
Defence, PW Botha. It indicates the rapid expansion of the domestic arms industry in 
South Africa since the inception of ARMS COR. South Africa faced a mandatory UN 
arms embargo in the late 1970s.45 The continued occupation of South West Africa, the 
invasion of Angola and increased internal repression following the riots of 16 June 
1976, sounded the death knell for South Africa's acquisition of foreign arms.46 
Between 1978 and 1979 ARMSCOR concluded 6 494 contracts with foreign arms 
suppliers to the value of R 1, 742 million, even though the embargo had been in place 
for a year. In the following year the number of contracts increased to well over 9 
000.47 ARMSCOR was in the middle of a rapid rise to supply the war effort.48 
South Africa's counter-insurgency war against the South West African People's 
Organisation (SW APO) was characterised by frequent incursions into neighbouring 
Angola. These actions were also aimed at the armed forces of Angola (FAPLA) and 
combatants of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK).49 South Africa's involvement in conflicts in 
South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique was legitimated as a fight 
against the spread of Communist proxies in Southern Africa. This discourse took hold 
within the SADF and P.W Botha's MOD. Botha and his advisors formulated their 
militaristic policy of 'Total Strategy,' and argued that it was the only way South 
44 McWilliams, 21. 
45 See William Cobbett, "Apartheid's Army and Arms Embargo," in Jacldyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, 
eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989). 
46 Ferreira, 65. 
47 McWilliams, 26. 
48 See Department of Defence. White Paper on Defence and Armaments Production. Pretoria: 
Government Printer, 1967-1977; and Department of Defence. White Paper on Defence and Armaments 
Supply. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1982-1984. 
49 Len Ie Roux and Henri Boshoff, "The State of the Military," in The State of the Nation, 











Africa could defend itself from the 'Total Onslaught' of Communism in Southern 
Africa. 50 
Botha's ascent to the position of Prime Minister (1979-84) and later as State President 
(1984-1989) saw the establishment of the National Security Management System 
(NSMS) and the State Security Council (SSC) as the policy-making brain. The SSC 
was the only statutory cabinet committee, having been established by the Security 
Intelligence and State Security Council Act of 1972. It included the President as 
chairman, his 'inner circle' of cabinet ministers and the chiefs of the various security 
departments.51 Gavin Cawthra argues that these institutions: 
"Provided military, intelligence and defence officers and officials (' securocrats') 
with considerable leverage over the policy process. ,,52 
This counter-revolutionary agenda influenced all state policy against any groups 
labelled by the government as 'Communist.' The SADF brass had overwhelming 
control over defence policy because the Defence Secretariat had been scrapped in the 
previous decade and no civilian influence existed within the military chain of 
command. Even Botha's Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, had previously 
been the Chief of the SADF. The SSC included the State President and the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, Law and Order, Defence and Justice. Many members were high 
ranking civil servants and 'private persons' not accountable to Parliament. State 
security policy was firmly in the hands of the 'Securocrats' on the SSC and not even 
Cabinet, let alone Parliament, retained much influence over the policy process. 53 
Legislative oversight over defence was by then a non-issue. 
The rise of what Frankel dubbed Pretoria's Praetorians created a secretive arms 
procurement environment in complete violation of the UN arms embargo. The 
mandatory arms embargo of 1977 dealt a severe blow to South Africa's arms industry, 
50 Stott, 10. 
51 Kuzwayo, 2. 
52 Gavin Cawthra, Reconceptualising Security for the Twenty-First Century: South Africa's experience 
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but also sparked a greater resolve to develop self-sufficiency within the defence 
industry. Since the late 1960s ARMScOR had been producing armaments under 
licenses acquired from overseas arms developers and importing various technology in 
order to keep the arms industry afloat.54 ARMS COR diverted attention towards 
import substitutions and the covert acquisition of technology and expertise, often 
dealing with pariah states. Within a few years, ARMScOR could modify and 
manufacture sophisticated armaments for the SADF's conflict in South West Africa 
and Angola.55 However, by 1981 the Rhodesian Bush War had ended with the 
independence of Zimbabwe and the Angolan Border War was for the time being 
scaled down. SADF orders decreased accordingly and ARMScOR once again 
diverted its attention towards the international arms market, this time as an arms 
producer, with reasonable success. 
By 1981 ARMScOR had become the largest arms industry in the region. With an 
annual turnover of Rl, 5 billion, ARMScOR employed 15 000 to 30000 people at 
any given time.56 Nonetheless, the Apartheid state's expenditure on defence continued 
to increase. Between 1982-1983 defence expenditure was close to R3 billion and by 
the mid-1980s 20 percent of Government's annual budget was allocated to defence. 
ARMScOR was allowed to form new companies such as Kentron, and merged many 
others to solidify the defence industry and speed up research, development (R&D), 
and production. Research institutions and universities were sub-contracted to do much 
of the R&D.s7 In order to maintain its production line and its technical expertise, 
ARMScOR had to produce over and above the needs of the SADF, hence 
ARMScOR's entry into the international market. In no time Apartheid South Africa's 
arms merchant became an earner of much-needed foreign exchange. South Africa's 
arms industry could not produce enough weaponry to match the number of weapons 
streaming into Southern Africa. Instead ARMScOR resolved to manufacture weapons 
of superior quality.58 ARMS COR retained this quality edge because it was secretly 
54 Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, About Tum: The Transformation of the South African Military 
and Intelligence, (Midrand: Jetline Print, 1995),255. 
55 Ferreira, 65. 
56 Ibid. 66. 











involved in co-production of weaponry with other states such as Taiwan and 
especially IsraeL59 Israel provided South Africa with much expertise and technology 
in the field of electronics, whilst ARMS COR provided its high expertise in ferro-
alloys, high grade steels and non-ferrous metals.60 A report in the Washington Post 
stated: 
"Defence companies in France, Italy and Israel- probably with the knowledge of 
their govemments- have helped maintain and upgrade major weapons systems 
provided to South Africa prior to the mandatory arms embargo. ,,61 
Clearly ARMS COR was kept afloat by its secret dealings with foreign arms traders 
who knowingly broke the arms embargo in order to maintain the influx of expertise 
and technology. The international arms market is of course not an exclusive economy, 
provided that clients have the wherewithal to pay. 
Throughout this period of increased defence spending, Parliamentary oversight was 
sidestepped as most acquisition orders were made through the Special Defence 
Account or SDA.62 This account was established by the Defence Special Account Act, 
whereby funding was to be appropriated by Parliament, surplus to the annual defence 
budget, for the requirements of the DOD. The Minister of Defence and the Minister of 
Finance would be required to consult and jointly request Parliament to provide x 
amount of funding at whichever time. The account was allowed to accrue an 
unlimited amount of funds. Unspent money was not required to be returned to the 
Treasury at the end of every financial year. The Chief of the South African Defence 
Force was the 'Accounting Officer' and responsible for managing the SDA. In any 
transparent democracy this responsibility would be given to a civilian within 
government. But the DOD had for many years not had a civilian secretariat. 
Moreover, the Minister of Finance exercised very little influence on the kind of 
58 McWilliams, 27. 
59 Naomi Chazan, "The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israeli Foreign Policy towards South Africa," African 
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expenditure from these funds and seldom questioned whether the expenditure was 
justified or not. Most of the expenditure remained secret and observers argue that 
most of the funds were used for the SADF and ARMSCOR. Thus, the generals 
controlled the purse strings and there was little, if any, constraint placed on the 
amount of funding funnelled into this account.63 The SDA served a laundering 
purpose as it would have been impossible to calculate Apartheid South Africa's 
Mll...EX by simply studying the annual defence budgets. The SDA was in effect an 
unofficial defence budget completely removed from the oversight of Parliament and 
civil society. The SDA exists today and it is the means by which the current 
government pays for the Strategic Arms Package.64 
Under the Armaments Development and Production Act of 1968, the State President 
enjoyed sweeping powers with regards to the arms industry and its transparency to 
both Parliament and the public. No information regarding the acquisition, supply, 
marketing, export, development, manufacture, repair or research of armaments could 
be made public without the written consent of the Minister of Defence.65 Nor was 
ARMSCOR subject to the Companies Act of 1926 or any other legislation aimed at 
regulating the private sector. ARMS COR was outside the oversight of Parliament and 
was given the kind of financial freedom and flexibility not enjoyed by any other 
government parastatal.66 All in all, ARMSCOR held a unique position within the 
politico-military-economic nexus of the Apartheid state and was virtually untouchable 
by civil society and/or Parliam nt. 
The massive increase in military expenditure or (Mll...EX) under 'Total Strategy' was 
constantly justified to the public and Parliament as necessary in order to protect the 
laager against aggression from within and mostly from without. This marketing ploy, 
was very much like the United States' Pentagon's annual publication, The Soviet 
Threat. The idea is to create an awareness of foreign threats and cultivate a fear of 
63 McWilliams, 85. 
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Soviet-made weaponry accumulating on South Africa's borders, to justify the 
Apartheid arms build-up and ARMSCOR's business.67 
2.3.2 The Fall from Grace or Not Quite (1990-1994) 
The AngolanlNamibian Border War ended in 1989. By the end of the conflict, SADF 
had lost its air superiority in the Southern African region. This was best demonstrated 
at the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which signalled the withdrawal of the SADF from 
Southern Angola. The peace agreements signed between Angola, Cuba, South Africa 
and the superpowers paved the way for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia as 
well. The high level of MILEX that characterised the regime of PW Botha could no 
longer be justified. International sanctions had taken their toll on South Africa's 
economy and the Nationalist government could no longer afford the expensive 
defence budgets.68 The new president, FW De Klerk, introduced massive cuts to the 
SADF's budget. The geo-political environment was changing rapidly with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and collapse of European Communist regimes. The threat of a 'Total 
Onslaught' was finally laid to rest. The SADF could no longer justify new arms and 
high budgetary support. ARMS COR could no longer rely on the DOD as its main 
client. Procurement orders dried up fast. 69 
ARMS COR was forced to double its efforts towards finding new clients on the 
international market. Between 1990 and 1994 the arms industry cut approximately 
half of its 160 OOO-strong workforce. ARMSCOR was restructured in 1992. DENEL 
was formed to assume control over all manufacturing and production of armaments. 
DENEL was placed under the responsibility of the Minister of Public Enterprises, 
whilst ARMSCOR remained under the Minister of Defence. ARMSCOR meanwhile 
retained its original responsibility of procurement of armaments and military 
equipment on behalf of the DOD.7o The main point of De Klerk's reforms are that 
they re-established civilian control over defence. State security policy underwent a 
healthy dose of liberalisation. De Klerk replaced the SSC with the State President's 
67 McWilliams. 63. 
68 Peter Batchelor and Susan Willett. Disarmament and Defence Industrial Adjustment in South Africa. 
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Office and Cabinet as the main centre of power within the state. The NSMS was also 
replaced by a National Coordinating Mechanism (NCM) in 1990. De Klerk 
effectively reclaimed the state apparatus from the 'securocrats.'71 He also appointed 
civilians like Roelf Meyer and Kobie Coetzee as Ministers of Defence so as to 
undercut the influence that the SADF had enjoyed through military men like General 
Magnus Malan. Between 1989 and 1993 the defence budget was cut by 40 percent, 
conscription abolished, and South Africa's nuclear weapons programme was 
blocked. 72 
However, Batchelor argues that although very significant, the reforms were 
inconsistent and did not go far enough. He cites a cabinet meeting in early 1990 where 
it was decided that the SADF would remain 'untouched' by the impending transition 
to majority rule. The SADF was to provide a core around which the transition could 
take place and would remain under the firm control of the government. 73 Here one can 
see that although the military's influence had been severely curtailed by De Klerk's 
regime, it remained the key player in the transition. The SADF was the government's 
reinsurance policy against an unfavourable outcome in negotiations with the ANC. To 
this end the SADF convinced the Nationalist government that it should meet with the 
ANC (read the MK) to discuss the future of the military under majority rule. 
During the period of negotiations in the early 1990s, a general amnesty from criminal 
and civil prosecution for HRV's was one of the first issues on which the negotiators 
from both the SADF and MK could find consensus. Their task, for most of 1993, was 
to decide the basis of transformation and integration of a new military for a post-
Apartheid South Africa. Their common concern was that this should be as stable and 
peaceful a process as possible. The negotiators' feelings, especially those of the 
SADF, were that democratic elections would not be successful without some 
assurance to the militant right and left that their misdeeds would not come back to 
haunt them, and that this incentive should come in the form of a general and 
unqualified amnesty.74 
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The NP negotiating strategy dictated that the SADF remain untouched by 
recriminations as it was to be the 'stable core around which the dynamic of change 
could occur.' 75 For the purposes of moving the crucial military negotiations along, 
this 'military pact' became more solidified once the human rights obstacle had been 
cleared and the two groups could begin to deal with the 'nuts and bolts' of military 
integration and transformation. Thus, as the greatest threat to democracy and 
possessing the most powerful coercive capability within the state, there was no 
question that the military would have to be the guarantor of the transition. A general 
amnesty would ensure that this organisation had sufficient incentive to fulfil that role. 
However, a general amnesty was not the only carrot that was placed on the table for 
the SADF and the MK. The promise of rearmament and a modem and technologically 
advanced military under the new dispensation did much to develop common ground 
and understanding between the hawks in the SADF and the MK. 
Meanwhile the structure of the defence budget changed dramatically between 1989 
and 1994. Much more of the defence budget was spent on personnel and operating 
costs, and much less was spent on procurement and R&D. Surplus military equipment 
was sold or withdrawn from service. Many major weapons projects were cancelled 
and/or postponed.76 South Africa's arms industry had been much maligned under the 
De Klerk regime. Many of the state arms companies were struggling to peddle their 
wares on the international market due to the global recession in the arms trade 
following the end of the Cold War. Much restructuring and adjustment within the 
newly-formed DENEL did much to increase the fortunes of some arms companies, 
whilst this was to the detriment of others. Reunert, Grintek and Altech were defence 
groups who benefited from DENEL's new focus on arms export. However, this 
upswing lasted only from 1992 until 1995, when these groups would experience 
financial difficulty and created much strain on the state. 
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However, the new democratically elected government of Nelson Mandela would 
nonetheless inherit a significant industry, contributing 1 percent of GDP.77 
2.4 Summary and Conclusion 
2.4.1 Prior to Mandatory Arms Embargo (1945-1977) 
Prior to the voluntary arms embargo of 1963, South Africa was very dependent on 
Britain as a supplier of armaments. The internal situation in South Africa became 
progressively worse and came to a head at Sharpeville in March of 1960. The 
aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre and the repression of resistance politics by the 
Apartheid state outraged the international community. Calls were made for an arms 
embargo on South Africa. 
South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961 and declared a Republic following the 
condemnation of the international community over the massacre in Sharpeville. The 
UN response to South Africa's internal oppression was a voluntary arms embargo in 
1963, although not adhered to by major arms suppliers like France and Britain. The 
Republic's response was to increase the number of arms imports and to attempt to 
develop its domestic armaments industry. By 1968 the state established ARMSCOR 
to control the defence industry. ARMSCOR expanded the domestic industry and 
increased the rate of arms acquisitions for the ever-expanding SADF. 
The DOD was also restructured and the civilian secretariat was removed. The Chief of 
the SADF was made the accounting officer and assumed responsibility for both the 
administration of the DOD and the operations of the SADF, thus relegating any 
civilian influence or direct oversight. 
Between the years 1968 and 1977 ARMSCOR increased the size of the defence 
industry and the level of self-sufficiency to keep pace with the growing demands of 
the SADF. Meanwhile, momentum increased within the international community for a 
mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. The 1976 riots and South Africa's invasion 
of Angola in 1975 provided the catalyst. In 1977 the UN declared Apartheid a crime 
against humanity and placed a mandatory ban on all arms shipments into South 
77 Christopher Wrigley, The South African deal: A Case Study in the Arms Trade, (London: Campaign 











Africa. The rise of the anTIS industry points to the strength of a modernising South 
African economy and increased dominance of the executive over Parliament. 
2.4.2 Under the Mandatory Arms Embargo (1977-1994) 
The ascension to power of PW Botha was a blessing for both ARMSCOR and the 
SADF. Under 'Total Strategy,' violence was a preferred tool of the state against 
internal resistance. On a regional level Total Strategy promoted the use of the SADF 
to destabilise neighbouring countries under the guise of combating Communism. The 
1980s was characterised by the emergence of the securocrats and the military, 
through the State Security Council, as the main influences over state policy. 
This period saw massive military expenditure, half of which could never be accounted 
for due to the Special Defence Account. Overall, the 1980s were by far the least 
democratic period in South Africa's history with regards to defence issues. With 
almost no transparency or accountability, the DOD, ARMSCOR and the Executive 
operated without the interference of civilians. The executive had mounted a virtual 
Presidential coup through the State Security Council and Parliament was rendered a 
'rubber stamp' institution. There was no democratic civilian control as Parliament was 
not in control of the military's purse strings.78 
Arms acquisitions continued under the mandatory embargo. ARMS COR became 
quite inventive in working the margins. Arms deals were signed with countries such 
as Israel and Taiwan, considered as fellow pariah states. South Africa even developed 
a nuclear weapons project. More important in this regard is the resilience displayed by 
the South African economy, which survived these years of financial misrule. 
The replacement of Botha by De Klerk did much to restore some civilian control over 
defence. Although significant, De Klerk's reforms did not go far enough, as he needed 
the SADF intact in the event that the negotiations with the ANC went sour. The key 
point here is that the military and ARMSCOR survived the transition era not 
unscathed, but intact. These institutions would take much of what they had learnt 
under Total Strategy into the new democratic era. 
78 Note that even so, this Parliament itself was not democratic as it had always been elected under an 











Three main things can be concluded here. The first is that legislative oversight in a 
Parliamentary democracy79 is a very difficult proposition. Executives in these systems 
are given much power with regards to the control of the military provided that they 
maintain their majority within the legislature. From a democratic point of view, 
parliamentary executive democracies face a greater challenge in legislative control 
over the military than is the case in constitutional democracies with strict separation 
of powers. 
Second, the arms embargo afforded the executive the ability to accrue an enormous 
amount of power. Sanction gave executives political legitimacy to further centralise 
power over the state. Botha's Presidency in the 1980s could be described as virtually 
imperial with regards to control over the military and arms acquisitions. Sanctions 
strengthen executives and weaken legislatures. 
Third, Parliament has never enjoyed effective control over defence in modem South 
Africa. The process of democratisation in South Africa in the early 1990s did very 
little to change the status quo. Although a constitutional democracy was established 
with democratic institutions of oversight, the Apartheid era prepared the ground for a 
Parliament that would struggle to assert its constitutional function of legislative 
control over the military. There exists continuity between the tradition of legislative 
control over defence under Apartheid and its condition at the outset of the post-
Apartheid democratic dispensation in 1994. 












3. ARMS ACQUISITIONS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: ROLES 
AND RESPONSmILITIES? 
3.1 Introduction 
'How can a democracy be defended with an undemocratic organization? ,80 
South Africa's post-Apartheid democratisation led to a conversion within defence. 
The thrust of this conversion has focussed around the role of 'defence in a 
democracy.' The ANC government has attempted to establish democratic civil-
military relations characterised by strong civilian control. 81 Civilian control should be 
characterised by strong legal restrictions on the military's role in internal security and 
intelligence operations, a civilian-headed defence ministry that controls and 
coordinates the defence sector, and legislative control and oversight of defence 
expenditure and policy. 82 Do post-Apartheid civil-military relations fit this 
description? 
For the most part, yes. The South African Constitution states that the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) will be subordinate and fully accountable to 
Parliament and the executive. The SANDF can only operate within the parameters of 
the Constitution, domestic legislation and international law and it is to respect human 
rights and South Africa's democratic process. In addition to this the defence policy 
and military activities are to be transparent so that there can be parliamentary and 
public scrutiny. 83 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the legislative control 
over arms acquisitions within a constitutional democracy. These roles and 
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responsibilities are entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic and the Defence 
White Paper. The chapter focuses on several actors within the defence sector. The 
chapter is organised into six parts. The first two parts deal with the Constitution and 
the Defence White Paper respectively. The third part discusses the Department of 
Defence (DOD), which consists of the civilian Defence Secretariat and the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF). This part discusses the role of the 
domestic arms industry in arms acquisitions, which consists of both ARMSCOR and 
DENEL. The fourth part moves onto the executive, which consists of the Presidency 
and Cabinet, and the Ministry of Defence. The fifth part investigates the roles and 
functions of the South African Parliament and its various oversight committees that 
deal with the defence sector. The committees include the Portfolio Standing 
Committee on Defence, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, the National 
Convention on Arms Control Committee, and the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts. 
3.2 The South African Constitution (1996) 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent 
with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. ,,84 
The parameters of governance and management over the DOD and the SANDF are 
enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The transitional 
arrangements between the African National Congress (ANC) of Nelson Mandela, and 
the NP government of FW de Klerk, culminated in the first democratically elected 
parliament in 1994. The interim constitution of 1993 and the final constitution of 1996 
governed the basic structures and powers of Parliament. The negotiating parties 
agreed to a parliamentary system characterised by a significant separation of powers 
between the executive and legislature. The ANC desired a parliament that would 
symbolise "people's power", whilst the NP government desired a strong check on 
executive power by the same institution.85 
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Prior to the constitutions of 1993 and 1996, the anned forces were not subject to any 
constitutional authority. Instead, the Defence Act of 1957 was the enabling legislation 
of the SADF. Neither the Constitution of 1961, nor the South African Constitution 
Act 1983, superseded the Defence Act. Thus, defence legislation under Apartheid was 
not required to conform to any constitutional constraints. However, the 1996 
Constitution is the supreme piece of legislation in the Republic and delineates the 
governance and management of the defence sector. The Constitution outlines the 
hierarchy of the defence sector. The Chief of the SANDF (CSANDF) is the executive 
commander and hislher command is under the direction of the Minister of Defence 
(MOD) during peacetime and under the President during states of national emergency. 
The MOD is also accountable to Parliament and Cabinet on behalf of the SANDF. 86 
The Constitution places national security under the authority of Parliament and the 
executive, and entrenches Parliament's powers of oversight over issues relating to 
national security.87 The post-Apartheid South African Parliament is also afforded a 
multiparty parliamentary committee system by the Constitution. These committees are 
required to exercise oversight over all the security services, as determined by 
legislation and/or the rules and orders of Parliament. The "chapter nine" institutions, 
including the Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the Human Rights 
Commission, are also afforded powers of oversight in this regard in conjunction with 
the relevant committees.88 Judith February argues that failure by these institutions to 
exercise their powers of oversight is in fact a constitutional failure.89 
3.3 The White Paper on Defence 
Although the origins of the SAP are within the Defence Review, the issue of 
reannament of the SANDF is much older. This is rooted in the pre-I994 negotiations 
between the MK and the SADF, the result of which was a promise of reannament of 
the SANDF in exchange that the military become the mid-wife to the transition to 
democracy. The Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee, consisting of the SADF, 
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MK, APLA, and the armies of the TBVC territories, and tasked to plan the future of 
the SANDF, was dominated by the SADF. This ensured that the SANDF force 
structure and design would be based largely on similar lines as the SADF.9o 
The White Paper on Defence was adopted by Parliament in 1996 as the guiding policy 
for the management of the DOD. It outlines South Africa's approach to security and 
delineates the roles and functions of the MOD, DOD and government within this 
approach. The White Paper adopted what is known in security circles as a "human 
security" approach to national security. The SANDF is tasked with the primary 
mission of defending RSA against external aggression, whilst maintaining a defensive 
posture in peacetime. The SANDF's secondary missions include international peace 
operations, border protection and assisting the SAPS.91 The White Paper is 
characterised by the democratic influence throughout its text, signalling a dramatic 
departure from Apartheid-era security policy. 
According to the White Paper on Defence, South Africa's national security strategy is 
predicated on a 'wider notion of security,' which encompasses the human, social, 
environmental and military security of the state and its citizens as enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The objective of the national security 
policy is the consolidation of democracy, the pursuit of social justice, economic 
development and a safe environment, a reduction in the level of crime, violence and 
political instability.92 Interestingly, this is similar to the concept of security under the 
Apartheid regime where the securocrats employed a wide and increasingly militarised 
view of security.93 
Nathan argues that this understanding of national security bears a resemblance with 
'Total Strategy' of the Apartheid regime in that both are concerned with political, 
economic and social security, but that the key distinction is that the former attempts to 
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demilitarise security whilst the latter attempted to militarise all aspects of security.94 
Current policy takes a 'broad view on security, but a narrow view on defence,' where 
the latter becomes a subset of the former.95 
The paper grew out of a need by the MOD to justify the budgetary requirements of the 
DOD. The Secretariat for Defence, then headed by Pierre Steyn, was newly 
established and did not possess the capacity to formulate policy. Thus, the 
responsibility fell on the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) to formulate a 
new policy framework for the defence sector, in conjunction with the input of many 
security analysts and academics. Cawthra comments: 
"The JSeD was very active during the White Paper process and insisted on ratifying 
the draft line by line. ,,96 
Policy was influenced by a strong concern for democratic civilian control over the 
defence sector. Mills points out that ANC political culture is characterised by 
transparency and democratic decision-making, which explains the approach taken by 
the JSCD in the drafting of the White Paper.97 The predominantly ANC members of 
the JSCD and the defence analysts wanted a narrow role for the military in a 
democratic South Africa. However, the human security approach, adopted by the 
White Paper, calls for the inclusion of non-military issues on the security agenda. 
Buzan has argued that this leads to a process of securitisation, where the military is 
able to involve itself in non-military areas within the state.98 This is exactly what the 
JSCD and many analysts were wary of, as the SADF had been involved in civilian 
projects and this led to the military's politicisation within the Apartheid state.99 This 
accounts for the inclusion of external defence as the primary mission of the SANDF 
in the White Paper. The White Paper says: 
94 "The 1996 Defence White Paper: An Agenda for State Demilitarisation?" 45. 
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"The SANDF may be employed in a range of secondary roles as prescribed by law, 
but its primary and essential function is service in defence of South Africa, for the 
protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. "I()I] 
31 
Although the White Paper embraces the new notion of security, it accepts the state-
centric realist view in the delineation of the functions and roles of the SANDF. The 
White Paper espouses the view that the SANDF be adequately equipped to fulfil this 
conventional mission. The White Paper indicates that the SANDF should be a 
balanced, modem and technologically advanced force, in order to fulfil its primary 
mission effectively and efficiently.lol This phrase is a product of pre-1994 
negotiations between the MK and the SADF. The White Paper posits that South 
Africa lacks any foreseeable external threats. But in the event of possible aggression 
such a force could not be equipped instantaneously, hence the need to arm and equip 
for any eventualities in the future. 102 
3.4 Department of Defence 
3.4.1 The Defence Secretariat 
The Defence Secretary is the chief accounting officer of the DODl03 and is 
responsible for formulating DOD policy and exercising oversight over the defence 
sector as a civilian member of the DOD. Within the Defence Secretariat there is an 
Acquisitions Division, which is headed by the Chief of Acquisitions. This chief is 
responsible for industrial and procurement policy for the DOD, coordinating all 
research and technology, and is accountable to the Defence Secretary. The Defence 
Secretariat is responsible for all acquisition activities. The Secretariat is to ensure that 
all acquisitions for the DOD are executed within national objectives, policies and 
constraints. The Secretariat is also expected to provide auditing of all Defence 
expenditure. 104 
100 Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence, (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1996),25. 
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The Defence Secretary chairs the Armament Acquisition Steering Board (AASB). The 
board approves non-cardinal projects and also screens cardinal acquisition projects. 
This is the second level of control in the approval of acquisition projects. The Board 
consists of members from the SANDF, the Secretariat and ARMSCOR. 105 The 
Secretariat's main function is to ensure the best 'bang for buck.' The Secretariat is 
tasked with maintaining the best quality in all acquisition projects, and ensuring that 
the expenditure for these projects falls within the financial constraints of the defence 
budget and the overall financial objectives of the state. 106 
Department of Defence 
Arms Acquisition Approval Structure 
15t Level of Control 
2nd Level of Control 





STEERING BOARD (AASB) 
Defence Secretary 
ARMAMENTS ACQUISITION 
CONTROL BOARD (AACB) 
Chief of SANDF 
Fig. 1 
As far as policy regarding arms contracting goes, it is the Secretariat's responsibility 
that all contracts are granted at the highest possible level. In other words, possible 
suppliers of defence systems are to be contracted for the development, production and 
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maintenance of these systems. The DOD does not deal with sub-contracted 
suppliers. IO? This point will be very important within the context of the Strategic 
Arms Package. 
3.4.2 The South African National Defence Force 
The post-Apartheid SANDF is challenged by an imbalance between its capital 
equipment and its numbers of personnel. The integration of the old SADF and the 
armed wings of the liberation movements created an inflated force. The SANDF is 
headed by the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (CSANDF), who 
enjoys executive command over the SANDF under the direction of the Minister of 
Defence in peacetime, and the President in times of national emergency. lOS In other 
words, the CSANDF is charged with ensuring that the defence policies, planning and 
administrative directives of the MOD are implemented accordingly. 109 
The South African National Defence Force is responsible for determining its own 
arms requirements, provided that these requirements fall in line with the approved 
structure of the force and the defence policies, programmes and budgets of the MOD, 
the Secretariat and Parliament. The SANDF takes responsibility for the overall 
management of armament acquisition projects. The SANDF ensures that defence 
systems are in line with stated requirements and that it receives these systems in that 
orderYo The third level of control in the armaments acquisition hierarchy is the 
Armament Acquisition Control Board (AACB), which is under the chairmanship of 
the Chief of Staff Logistics of the SANDE The AACB is responsible for the 
screening of all acquisition projects in terms of the stated requirements of the 
SANDE III 
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3.4.3. The Anns Industry 
3.4.3.1 ARMSCOR 
34 
The White Paper says that ARMSCOR is to manage all acquisition processes for the 
DOD. David Botha describes this management as follows: 
"Programme management, the drafting of tender documentation, and the awarding 
of contracts. It ensures that the technical, legal, and financial integrity of companies 
supplying acquisitions are in accordance with DOD requirements. Additional tasks 
include offering marketing support for the industry, facilitating participation in 
international armaments shows, and the co-management of Industrial Participation 
Programmes with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTl). ,,/12 
ARMS COR was restructured in April 1992. The state-owned company DENEL was 
established to take control of the domestic defence industry under the political 
authority of the Ministry of Public Enterprises. ARMSCOR remained under the MOD 
and retained its core function of arms procurement on behalf of the DOD. l13 
REUNERT, ALTECH and GRINTEK were public holding companies that were to 
make up the core of the domestic defence industry. The chairman of ARMSCOR was 
also made a member of the Defence Planning Committee, which is chaired by the 
Minister of Defence.114 The ANC initially espoused a developmental approach to 
security. This changed once Joe Modise and Ronnie Kasrils took charge of the MOD. 
They soon realised that the ANC's new policy ideas had to coexist within the old 
security structures. Kasrils especially views the domestic defence industry as a 
valuable leader within the state's technological base and an important earner of 
foreign exchangeYs ARMSCORIDENEL is a statutory body and a state-owned 
company.116 
By 1995 South Africa was on the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's list of 
the twenty top international arms exporters at a position of twelve. The lifting of the 
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mandatory arms embargo of 1977 opened the way for South Africa's defence industry 
to compete on the international market. South Africa sold arms to a variety of 
countries. This aggressive marketing by domestic manufacturers stemmed from a 
need to make up for the shortfall in the domestic defence budget and the trickle of 
procurement by the DOD. Il7 
The government has created a somewhat contradictory policy environment. On the 
one hand government has adopted a normative foreign policy framework with all the 
bells and whistles of human rights and multilateralism, and on the other hand it has 
aggressively pursued the export of South African arms. Some of these foreign clients 
possess very questionable human rights records or are involved in intrastate conflict. 
Two examples of these contradictions are South Africa's sale of arms to the 
RwandalBurundi region between 1994 and 1995, and the proposed sale of arms to 
Syria, commonly known as the Wazan debacle.ll8 Nonetheless, the domestic defence 
industry is considered a national asset by Government and is here to stay. But what is 
its role within the context of arms procurement for the DOD? 
The post-Apartheid government has changed industrial policy for the defence industry 
in South Africa. Self-sufficiency in armaments production is no longer an aim of the 
DOD, but rather to maintain limited self-sufficiency in certain areas of defence. Thus, 
instead of producing large-scale weapon systems like fighter jets and tanks, which 
will be procured from foreign sources, the domestic industry will produce computer 
systems and ammunition for such systems. Domestic procurement of defence systems 
is of course preferred above imports, within budgetary constraints. When defence 
systems are procured from foreign contractors a premium is placed on securing a 
maximum amount of domestic production and the transfer of technology to the 
domestic industry. Counter-trade agreements are the norm for all foreign procurement 
of defence systems. The DOD wishes to encourage competition for contract tenders so 
as to ensure the best deals available. Tenders are supposed to be awarded on the basis 
of value for money and life cycle costs of the defence systems to be procured.1l9 
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ARMSCOR plays a pivotal role within the process of arms acquisitions. The 
corporation is required to manage all programmes and the contracting of the defence 
industry. Most of the contracting of the defence industry is of course with the state-
owned company DENEL. ARMSCOR ensures that the programmes maintain their 
technical, financial and legal integrity in accordance with the requirements of the 
MOD. ARMSCOR also is tasked with managing all defence industrial development 
so as to support armament acquisition programmes.120 
3.4.3.2 DENEL 
However, the actual production work is done under the auspices of DENEL, which 
operates under the Ministry of Public Enterprises. DENEL is a profit-orientated state 
asset and is thus expected to compete internationally like any private commercial 
enterprise. 121 
DENEL was established in 1992 as the manufacturing partner of ARMS COR under 
the Ministry of Public Enterprises. DENEL is an economically independent industrial 
giant and operates under the Companies Act, unlike the situation in the Apartheid-era 
whereby ARMSCOR was not accountable under this Act.122 Initially DENEL aimed 
to follow a process of defence conversion whereby it would convert its defence 
production to civilian use. This, however, proved too expensive a strategy and, 
coupled with defence cuts, DENEL decided to rather find new international markets. 
DENEL, along with other defence companies Reunert, Altech, Plessy and Grineker, 
account for 90 percent of the domestic industry's capital expenditure. By 1997 arms 
had becomes South Africa's second largest manufactured export, although it accounts 
for less than 1,2 percent of GDP and only one percent of manufacturing jobs in South 
Africa. Although South African companies hold less than one percent of the 
international arms market, they have developed enough expertise to maintain this 
share. 123 
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The DOD expects that the domestic defence industry is contracted to carry out the 
research, design, development, manufacture, testing, maintenance and support of 
defence systems. The industry is also compelled to implement its marketing and 
export of armament within the framework of the relevant national policies and 
approval of the appropriate departments of state. 124 
3.5 The Executive: Cabinet 
3.5.1 The Presidency 
The Presidency has a limited, but very important role to play within Strategic Arms 
Acquisition programmes. In order for the defence industry, especially DENEL, to 
achieve the lowest possible cost of its arms it is important to increase production. The 
quantity of armament required by the SANDF is too small, thus export is very 
important in keeping costs down. The Presidency plays an important role in 
encouraging overseas clients to basically 'buy South African.' The government has a 
direct interest in arms export gaining foreign exchange and other technology. 125 Miller 
argues that the international arms trade is very much determined by foreign policy. 
She says: 
"Civil and military trade are inter-related in that the willingness to supply defence 
goods becomes the price of access to the wider civil market. ,,126 
Government views the domestic defence industry as a key to unlock international 
markets for civilian goods from South Africa and to ensure favourable import of other 
civilian goods into South Africa. Given the ANC government's obsessive pursuit of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into South Africa, the idea that arms acquisition 
programmes are a form of economic foreign policy is not that farfetched. 127 In any 
event, the international arms market saw a decline in sales following the end of the 
Cold War. Sales have, however, increased since 1996 by about 8 percent from the 
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previous year. In a tight arms market, South Africa's ability to peddle its wares, like 
the Rooivalk attack helicopter and the Rooikat armoured car, is dependant on 
successful and competitive marketing. In this regard the Presidency is seen as an 
important cog in the marketing machine. 128 
3.5.2 The Ministry of Defence 
The MOD has changed the ANC's pre-election policy of disarmament and 
demilitarisation to one more characteristic of economic pragmatism. The MOD views 
the defence industry as an asset that gives South Africa international status. That also 
allows her to partner the major powers in confronting the security agenda within 
Africa. The MOD argues that the post-Cold War security environment requires South 
Africa to maintain a modem, well-equipped and technologically advanced SANDF. 
This policy is justified by the instability and insecurity that pervades Sub-Saharan 
Africa.129 The policy change was not unanimously welcomed within the ANC. For 
instance, the Minister in charge of the then Reconstruction and Development Program 
(RDP) , Jay Naidoo, argued that security should not be equated with defence. Civil 
society argued that South Africa's insecurity lay in ethnic tensions, economic 
refugees, environmental destruction, small arms proliferation and economic 
inequality. Massive military expenditure was thus unnecessary in their view.130 This 
tension would continue well into the government of Thabo Mbeki in 1999. 
Final political authority and responsibility for routine/non-cardinal arms acquisition 
rests with the Minister of Defence. The only exception is in the case of large-scale 
cardinal projects like the Strategic Arms Package that require the political approval of 
the Presidency and Cabinet. Government's defence acquisition policy states that any 
major procurement of defence systems (known as cardinal programmes) must be 
approved by Cabinet, under the oversight of Parliament's Joint Standing Committee 
on Defence. 131 The Minister chairs the highest and final level of committee of control 
within the acquisitions hierarchy of the DOD. This committee is the Armament 
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Acquisition Council (AAC).132 The AAC membership includes the Defence Secretary, 
the CSANDF and the Executive General Manager of ARMSCOR. The AAC approves 
armament acquisition policy, approves all armament acquisition budgets and approves 
all cardinal projects. 133 
3.6 Parliament 
3.6.1 Portfolio Standing Committee on Defence 
"The much lauded principle of good governance is a by product of parliamentary and 
civil oversight of the functions of the executive. ,,134 
No constitutional arrangements existed regarding parliamentary oversight prior to 
1994. Neither was anything said about parliamentary committees. The 1983 
Constitution merely stated that the President's Council could make rules and orders, 
but this body consisted of the executive. Thus, Parliament had no constitutional 
powers of oversight over the executive.13S However, the post-Apartheid Parliament 
has developed a multi-party committee system, as required in the 1996 Constitution. 
The Portfolio Committee on Defence (PSCD) comprises all the political parties that 
enjoy representation in the National Assembly (NA). The committee, although similar 
to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence in function, additionally deals with any 
legislation regarding the defence sector. The PSCD is mandated to monitor, 
investigate and enquire into any defence policy. The committee also plays a main role 
in the approval by the N A, as a whole, of the defence budget and the deployment of 
SANDF personneL The PSCD has the power to subpoena any individual, including 
any member of the executive, to give testimony that it may deem necessary to aid the 
committee in its work.136 However, the main point that the White Paper makes about 
the acquisitions process is that all major arms procurement and acquisitions must have 
the approval of Parliament. 137 
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3.6.2 Joint Standing Committee on Defence 
The JSCD enjoys broader powers of oversight, although it is not mandated to deal 
with defence legislation. The committee focuses on annament policy and the 
SANDF's state of readiness. The committee differs from the PSCD in that it consists 
of members from both the NA and the NCOP. It is modelled on the Committee on 
Defence of the German Bundestag.138 However, not all parties in Parliament are 
represented in the JSCD. In order to have representation within the JSCD, parties have 
to occupy more than ten seats in the NA.139 Wide-ranging powers of investigation are 
afforded to the committee by the Constitution. The JSCD is a creation of necessity out 
of South Africa's transition. The committee was set up to smooth the integration 
process of the new SANDF, which was formed from an amalgamation of the former 
non-statutory and statutory forces. The committee was tasked to exercise oversight 
over the 1998 Defence Review process, which covered issues of transformation, 
structure, budgets, organisation within the SANDE140 Although the PSCD, the JSCD 
and SCOPA are mandated to exercise oversight in the acquisition process of the 
DOD, in reality it is the JSCD that plays the main oversight role in this regard. Often 
the distinction in powers and functions of these committees are not clear. 141 
One of the main problems the committee has faced is the high rate of turnover among 
members. New members often have little or no experience in defence matters.142 
Moreover, the committee lacks specialised research support and is often bombarded 
with overly technical information by planners from the SANDE Thus, for all its good 
work it lags behind the SANDF in terms of understanding the technocratic aspects of 
defence issues. 143 The JSCD is a clear representation of the problems facing 
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parliamentary oversight committees in new democracies, especially where the 
military has enjoyed as much corporate autonomy as under the Total Strategy years. 
3.6.3 National Convention Arms Control Committee 
The NCACC is an important cog within Parliament's oversight mechanism. The 
committee is tasked with two functions. The first is to exercise oversight in the 
acquisition, procurement and export of all arms and the second is to design arms 
acquisition policy for the SANDF. Furthermore, the NCACC is charged with 
evaluating all applications for arms-related research, development, manufacturing, 
marketing, contracting and grants permits for these activities. l44 According to Mills 
the committee is also mandated to approve all acquisitions of arms into South Africa, 
though as we will see this was not the case in the Strategic Arms Package. 145 This 
mandate is covered in Chapter Eight of the White Paper on Defence 1996, which 
outlines the scope and nature of the NCACC' s work. 
The NCACC was established on the recommendation of the Cameron Commission of 
Inquiry into the 'Wazan' debacle. ARMSCOR had been implicated in a proposed sale 
of armaments to Lebanon in 1994. However, it was later learned that the end user of 
the armaments was in fact Yemen, which was a banned purchaser of arms by the 
South African government due to its internal conflict. The debacle caused significant 
damage to South Africa's new image as an upholder of human rights and 
multilateralism. The response of the government was to establish the NCACe. 
However, the contradiction between South Africa's arms exports and its foreign 
policy remains with recent reports that South African-made RG-31 armoured 
personnel carriers have been used by the US Army and private military companies in 
Iraq. 
The NCACC was set to become a statutory body when the National Conventional 
Arms Control Bill was tabled before the PSCD in July of 2000.146 However, the Bill 
was rejected on the grounds that it deviated from the Constitution and the White Paper 
on Defence. Moreover, the Bill was tabled after a long delay even though the NCACC 
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had been in existence for some time. It is interesting that the Bill was only submitted 
before the PSCD in 2000 almost one year after the Strategic Arms Package deals had 
been signed by Cabinet. The proposed Bill will give the NCACC powers of consent 
over all armament exports and imports for the use of the SANDF. 
3.6.4 Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
The DOD is subject to external audit, as required by the Constitution, and this 
function is fulfilled by the office of the Auditor-General who in tum reports to 
SCOPA. February argues that SCOPA had developed a status as the most efficient 
committees within Parliament. But this reputation was tarnished by the Arms Deal.147 
Nonetheless, SCOPA, unlike other committees, does not deal with policy or 
legislation, but focuses solely on public expenditure by government. The committee's 
task is to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of government's management of state 
finances. The committee checks whether every government department's expenditure 
is in line with their respective budgets. 148 The DOD is no exception in this regard and 
falls directly within the ambit of financial oversight by SCOPA, including arms 
acquisitions. 
Recent years have seen the expansion of executive dominance over the legislature 
with regards to governance. Anthony Butler argues that the nature of policy has 
changed in such a way that executive power vis a vis parliament has grown 
substantially, relegating many parliaments (with the exception of the United States 
Congress) to no more than rubber stamp bodies.149 
Contemporary wisdom is that policy is best suited for the executive, which was 
designed for this task. Butler describes policy as complex and very technical. The 
volume of information and activity can overwhelm parliamentarians who cannot 
match the resources at the disposal of the executive. Contemporary policy also 
requires co-ordination, leadership and economic intervention, all of which fall within 
the expertise and capacity of the executive. ISO Parliament is ill equipped to match the 
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executive and thus most governance is left to the latter. Butler summarises by 
describing executive dominance at the expense of the legislature as "a natural and 
inexorable process. ,,151 If it is that parliaments have been emasculated over the years, 
then the contention is that parliaments only recover this 'lost power' over governance 
through robust oversight over the executive's management of state bureaucracies, 
especially the military. 
Parliaments around the world, with a few exceptions, occupy a lower status to the 
executive. The Third Wave of Democratisation has placed legislatures back on the 
agenda of those countries where previously executive dominance, at the expense of 
the judiciary and legislature, had been the standard. 152 Apartheid South Africa 
provides a sterling example in this regard. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Union 
argues that, given the reality of executive dominance, parliamentary oversight is 
sorely lacking in many of its member countries. 153 South Africa's Parliament is no 
different and definitely suffers from these weaknesses. Parliament in the Apartheid 
era enjoyed virtually no oversight powers because of centralisation by the NP 
executive and the absence of a Constitution that served as the final institution of 
authority. The post-Apartheid Parliament, though operating in a constitutional 
democracy, has continued this tradition of weak oversight. Though Parliament has 
formal and institutionalised powers of oversight, the executive continues to enjoy a 
majority that allows it to escape the type of robust oversight seen in a system with 
strict separation of powers, such as in the United States Congress. Nonetheless, 
Parliament has played a critical role in transforming the security debate in South 
Africa, most notably in the White Paper on Defence and issues of force integration 
and gender representation. 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
Civil-military relations in post-Apartheid South Africa is characterised by a concerted 
effort on the part of government to establish democratic civilian control over defence. 
150 Ibid. 4. 
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The Constitution of 1996 and the Defence White Paper of the same year set out the 
framework for this democratic legislative control, in a sharp move away from the 
Praetorian tendencies of the Total Strategy years. The SANDF have accepted this 
situation, although with many points of contention over the years. But this is expected 
in a democratising state like South Africa where the functions, roles and 
responsibilities of defence actors are quite often forged through conflict and points of 
contention. One could give South Africa's civil-military relations a relatively average 
bill of health, as there is much further to go in this regard. 
Government is keen on maintaining ARMSCORfDENEL's share of the international 
arms market and to secure a limited self-sufficiency in arms production for the 
SANDF. The White Paper argues for a modem and technologically advanced SANDF 
and here in lies the basis for defence industrial policy. The domestic defence industry 
remains an important sector within the state and this is confirmed by attitudes within 
the MOD and at least half of Cabinet. More importantly the Presidency has taken on a 
role whereby it views the export of armaments to the international market as an 
important vehicle for creating FDI into South Africa's emerging economy. 
There are three levels of control within the armament acquisitions hierarchy of the 
DOD. These levels of control are a far cry from the days of Total Strategy in terms of 
transparency and auditing. It is important to note that all large scale cardinal projects, 
like the Strategic Arms Package (SAP), require the approval of Cabinet. The role of 
Parliament is to exercise oversight throughout the acquisition process, but the nature 
of this oversight has not been quite fully understood and this is one of the main points 
of contention within the context of the SAP. 
Three things become clear in this chapter. First, there are two types of arms 
acquisitions in the South African defence sector. The first is a routine or otherwise 
known as non-cardinal acquisition program. In South Africa the Minister of Defence 
assumes responsibility for these types of programs. These programs are a common 
occurrence and often do not carry high expenditure, thus they are not usually 
controversial in nature. The second type is the strategic arms acquisition, which in 











a rare occurrence, expensive and tend to be cloaked in controversy. The Strategic 
Arms Package or Arms Deal is the first example of the second type in South Africa. 
Second, Parliament in South Africa is weak in comparison to the Executive. 
Democratic South Africa is a constitutional democracy as opposed to the limited and 
exclusive parliamentary democracy under Apartheid. However, the tradition of weak 
oversight over the military has continued. Though oversight is formally 
institutionalised within the Constitution, strict party discipline exercised within the 
majority party dilute the quality of oversight. Parliament suffers from a lack of 
capacity in order to exercise robust oversight, especially over the military. 
Parliamentarians lack knowledge and experience of the defence sector and 
Parliament's research capacity is under-resourced. Thus, Parliament's oversight 
ability remains weak within democratic South Africa. 
Third, legislative control over the military is idealised within civil-military relations 
literature. In practice, legislatures struggle to hold the executive and the military 
accountable. Control over budgets and the ability to declare wars are the two key 
pillars of legislative control over the military. But these require robust oversight, and 
legislatures are often sidelined by executives in this regard. Moreover, legislatures 












4. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS PACKAGE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to make a critical analysis of the Strategic Arms Package with 
regards to several issues. The primary purpose is to assess the role of the relevant 
actors within the context of the SAP according to their assigned roles in the 
Constitution and the Defence White Paper. These actors include the DOD, consisting 
of the SANDF and the Defence Secretariat, the Presidency and Cabinet, ARMSCOR 
and the Parliament. 
The chapter looks first at the origins of the SAP and focuses on the Defence Review 
process of 1998. It was this process which set the ball rolling for the SAP acquisition 
programme. Within this study we also ascertain exactly what kind of defence systems 
were procured and from which contractors and for how much. The chapter is then 
organised into two main sections, which are titled with two common criticisms of the 
SAP. The first criticism considers the military necessity of the defence systems and 
hardware purchased. The hypothesis is that some of the items purchased could be 
argued to fall within the strategic understanding of South Africa's defence needs, 
whilst others were not necessary. The second criticism is organised into two parts, the 
first focuses on the alternatives to the items purchased within the SAP and the second 
part investigates the 'offsets' agreements that formed part of the SAP. Here the 
hypothesis is that there were indeed more affordable alternatives to the items that 
were contracted. With regards to the offset agreements, it will be clear that the SAP's 
legitimacy in the eyes of Parliament and civil society was manufactured on the back 
of these agreements, but that their validity is sceptical at best. These issues could have 
far reaching implications in terms of the affordability of the deal in the future. 
4.2 The Defence Review Process (1998) 
The White Paper for Defence, although significant in its scope, left much work to be 
done in terms of the SANDF' s force structure and design. The consequent Defence 
Review of 1998 was set to fulfil this task, as well as providing a forum for wide 
ranging consultation amongst South African society on defence pOlicy.154 The 
Defence Review was split into different working groups who were charged with 











formulating policy on various issues. Cawthra notes that the involvement of NGOs in 
the human resources working group, resulted in some very progressive policies in 
terms of the rights of women and homosexuals. ISS This could be attributed to the 
presence of many people who had been involved in activism within civil society under 
Apartheid. 
However, he also notes that more 'technical' issues, from a military standpoint, were 
not subjected to as much scrutiny by these groups. This was especially the case with 
the formulation of the SANDF's force design, where members of the SANDF were 
able to outsmart the activist lobby. In the end, the JSCD was presented with four 
possible options regarding the design and structure of the SANDF. See the table 
below: 
Option Option Option 
1 2 4 
5010 6014 5912 
Personnel 
Full-time Com onent 22000 36000 27200 
69400 98000 82000 
32 32 44 
96 96 48 64 
Submarines 4 4 4 
Corvettes 6 6 8 6 
Table 1156 
Un surprisingly, the working group endorsed the first option that included corvettes for 
the South African Navy (SAN) and fighter aircraft for the South Africa Air Force 
(SAAF).157 The Review reaffirmed the White Paper's commitment to a 'strategic 
defensive posture,' but included the ability to mount offensive operations with the use 
of conventional forces in order to repel any external attack from a similar military 
power. In order for the SANDF to maintain such a military capability, the Review 
chose the option endorsed by the working group. The SANDF would retain a core 
conventional force, read corvettes and fighter jets, which could be rapidly expanded in 
155 "Security Governance in South Africa," 5. 
156 Department of Defence, Defence Review, (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1998), 44. 











times of crises. 158 Here one sees an early instance of manufactured legitimacy for the 
impending Strategic Arms Package. 
As far as acquisition of arms and equipment were concerned, the Defence Review 
made significant changes to the future management of these processes. The Review 
rejected the old policy that RSA should have self-sufficiency in its arms requirements, 
except in key areas. A decision was taken to maximize the use of local suppliers, and 
more significantly, all platform suppliers 159 were to be responsible for the sub-
contracting of suppliers of subsystems.160 This is a crucial development in the Review 
in terms of the acquisitions process and our understanding of allegations of corruption 
within the SAP process. However, much policy concerning the defence industry was 
left to be dealt with by the NCACC in the 1999 White Paper on Defence-Related 
Industries. 
There was much criticism of the Review, even at the time of its approval by 
Parliament. The Institute for Security Studies, in a submission to the PSCD, argues 
that the Review is significantly flawed in its emphasis on the SANDF' s conventional 
ability to fulfil its primary mission of defending RSA against foreign aggression. They 
argue that in fact, the current security context within Southern Africa and South 
Africa domestically, dictates that the SANDF is more likely to be required to fulfill its 
secondary missions such as peace operations and assisting the SAPS. The 
conventional capability of the SANDF, as promulgated in the Review, is ill suited to 
these missions. 161 Ferreira argues that the emphasis on the primary mission within the 
Review indicates that legitimating the SANDF's conventional core force was 
uppermost in the minds of those wishing to see the re-equipment and re-armament of 
the SANDF. 162 In other words, the Defence Review was used as a legitimating 
mechanism for the impending Strategic Arms Package. Interestingly, the approval of 
158 Ibid. 15. 
159 Here a "platform" refers to a single unit of military hardware i.e. A fighter jet or a corvette. 
Previously, various parts of a platform would have been sourced from different suppliers. 
160 "South Africa's Defence Industry," 5. 
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the Review by Parliament has often been used by members of the executive, the MOD 
and the DOD, as an indication that Parliament had in fact approved the SAP itself. 
However, as February correctly points out, Parliament's approval of the Review is not 
tantamount to an approval of the SAP. What Parliament had approved was an ideal 
image of the SANDF force design, subject to budgetary constraints.163 Moreover, the 
Review did not include details about the exact cost of the various options to the state's 
budget and thus Parliament was not in an informed position to approve expenditure on 
re-armament. 164 
The Defence Review, although characterized by a transparent and consultative 
process, paved the way for the Strategic Arms Package, which would have massive 
implications throughout the political system and the economy. Given the nature of the 
Review process, one could make a strong though cynical argument that the Review 
provided an instant source of legitimacy for the SAP. 
4.3 The Roots of the SAP 
Although the SAP deals were only signed in 1999, lobbying by the SAN to acquire a 
blue water fleet began as early as 1994. The then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, 
had approached Parliament with a request to acquire corvettes from a Spanish 
company Bazan. However, the involvement of the newly established Joint Standing 
Committee on Defence (JSCD) put a spanner in the works, arguing that first the very 
legitimacy of the SANDF had to be assessed before any acquisitions could be 
approved. 165 The refusal by the JSCD is what sparked the Defence Review process. 
The Minister subsequently withdrew his request from Parliament's agenda in 1995, 
but placed the issues of corvettes back on the agenda in 1997. By 1997, the DOD was 
far into negotiations with German and French consortiums as possible suppliers of the 
corvettes, long before the Defence Review had even been approved by Parliament. 
Throughout the Review process, the Germans had apparently been lobbying various 
members of the working groups and 'wining and dining' influential members within 
163 February, 3. 
164 Ferreira, 77. 
165 Thandi Modise. "Parliamentary Oversight of the South African Department of Defence: 1994-
2003," in Guarding the Guardians, ed. Len Le Roux and Martin Rupiya, (Tshwane: Institute for 











the JSCD. 166 A case in point being the recent conviction of the then chairperson of the 
JSCD, Tony Yengeni, of defrauding Parliament when he accepted a discount provided 
by Daimler South Africa on a luxury vehicle. 
The period preceding the signing of the agreements was characterized by intense 
lobbying behinds the scenes by those advocating for the SAP, most of all the SAN. 
The military was very successful at lobbying influential MPs, arguing that the 
SANDFs equipment was obsolete. Here is where the lack of expertise in military 
matters on the part of MPs was sorely showed up. One could argue that is why MPs 
have access to research units within Parliament in order to fill this gap, but at the time 
Parliament's research capabilities were limited. In any event, the monopoly on 
military technical expertise was on the side of those advocating for the SAP, a fact 
that was strongly impressed on those who did not. Moreover, the promise of job 
creation to the tune of an estimated 65 000 jobs and possible offsets of over RlOO 
billion pumped into a struggling economy, is what really tipped the scales in the 
favour of the militarists.167 
Offset agreements are used by arms companies to add incentives for the possible 
buyer to award them arms contracts. There are two kinds of offsets agreements. One 
involves a counter-purchase where the foreign supplier company agrees to buy 
components from local manufacturers in exchange for the right to supply the required 
hardware.168 The other is when the foreign supplier agrees to investments into the 
local economy, especially within the arms industry. 169 
Nonetheless, many MPs and influential figures within the SAP process were enticed 
by the promises of offsets. From a defence industry standpoint, the SAP was a 
blessing. The domestic South African arms industry had by the mid-1990s become a 
166 Ferreira. 72. 
167 Laurie Nathan. "Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy," in International 
Affairs VoISl, No.2, (2005), 369. 
168 Wrigley, 1. 
169 However, much controversy surrounds the legitimacy of offsets within the arms trade around the 











financial liability for the state. Attempts to launch a competitive foray into the world 
arms market had not been successful and it soon became clear that an external 
injection of capital and expertise was needed. This would come in the form of the 
offset agreements attached to the SAP. The benefits for government was that it could 
finally offload control of unprofitable arms companies to black economic 
empowerment schemes and foreign companies, and retain those cash cows that would 
benefit from NIP projects. l7O While the benefit for the foreign arms companies are 
obvious. Needless to say, the successful negotiation of the SAP was in the financial 
interests of many influential figures in South African business and politics. 
Lobbying eventually became senous business when tenders were advertised for 
suppliers for the various items on the DOD' s shopping list. Four committees were 
established to consider the various tenders, a technical committee, a finance merit 
committee, a defence industrial participation (DIP) committee, and a national 
industrial participation committee. Tenders were given marks out of 300. All results 
were given to the coordinating Strategic Offers Committee for consideration, who in 
tum submitted its results to the Armament Acquisition Steering Board. 
Recommendations were then forwarded to the Armaments Acquisition Council 
(AAC). The AAC reported to the Minister's Committee, chaired by then Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki, who in tum reported to Cabinet. l7l 
By December 1999, the government announced that it had signed agreements with 
various suppliers to re-equip the SANDF, with the SAN and the SAAF being the chief 
beneficiaries of the SAP.l72 These contracts will cost the South African tax payer 
billions of Rands and divert this revenue away from much needed social projects such 
as housing, education and health. The very first question that comes to mind is 
whether the SAP was necessary in the first place? 
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4.4 Criticism One: Assessing the military necessity 
The White Paper and the Defence Review hold that the SANDF has a primary 
function of defending RSA against external aggression. We have ascertained that this 
condition was accepted due to the fear amongst many 'doves' within Parliament and 
civil society that the SANDF would otherwise involve itself in civilian matters. On 
the other side many 'hawks' saw this as a useful means to legitimate arms purchases. 
We have also ascertained that the SANDF will for the foreseeable future be primarily 
involved in performing secondary functions, for which its conventional capability is 
ill suited. In other words, it makes little sense that you would need a jet fighter to 
perform peace operations in the Great Lakes region, let alone a corvette. Simply put, 
the SAP has equipped the SANDF for the wrong mission. 
Although the SAP consists of five different types of military hardware, the 
submarines and the jet fighters have provided much ammunition for critics of the 
SAP. The fighter jets will definitely afford the SAAF complete air superiority over 
Sub-Saharan African skies. However, South Africa is bordered to the north by 
economically dependant countries that have no incentive to threaten South Africa's 
sea or airspace. To the east, south and west are expanses of ocean. The only African 
countries that possess submarines are Algeria, Egypt and Libya, all operating in the 
Mediterranean.173 Even if one were to accept the White Paper and Review's assertion 
that South Africa should retain the conventional capability to repel possible external 
aggression in the distant future, this aggression is likely to be a land based offensive. 
Such a defense is more likely to require a well equipped SA Army, which has not 
been a beneficiary of the SAP. The submarines and the fighter jets seem to be an 
extravagance. However, given policies like NEP AD and the context of the African 
Union, the government's foreign policy view is that a well equipped, modem and 
technologically advanced SANDF seems to give South Africa much clout in these 
international organisations. 
Williams argues that the SAP has contributed to a possible regional arms race and that 
the corvettes, submarines and jet fighters are 'offensive' weapons that are contrary to 
173 Leon Engelbrecht, "South Africa's multi-billion arms programme revisited: Part Two," in Defence 











South Africa's foreign policy of co-operative defence with its neighbours. 174 
Moreover, many human security and development proponents argue that given the 
nature of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, traditional military strength is not the answer 
to the security challenges that face a regional power like South Africa. 175 The 
majority of African conflicts are of an intrastate type. The traditional understanding 
of security being a territorial thing is outdated and security threats are more complex 
in the post-Cold War setting.176 The White Paper on Defence does however embrace a 
wider notion of security, but there has indeed been a breakaway from this on certain 
issues within the Defence Review process. 
Harris argues that the military has undergone too much 'mission creep,' for example 
whereby the corvettes are to be used to protect the coastal economic zones of the 
Southern African coast. He argues that privatizing this function or mandating another 
government department would make more cost effective sense.177 He points out that 
the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism has recently launched three 
inshore patrol vessels and one deep sea patrol vessel to patrol South Africa's 
exclusive economic zone. The cost of these vessels was a total of R500 million whilst 
the Meko class corvettes come with a price tag of R6,9 billion. The cost of the 
corvettes in the long term will be more than double that amount.178 He goes further to 
argue that if South Africa wishes to maintain a defence force that is built around a 
'defensively orientated' core, then the size and expenditure on this core component 
should be in reference to the military strength of South Africa's neighbours. The 
SANDF already dominates the region without the expenditure of the SAP.179 
174 Rocky Williams, "Human Security and the Transfonnation of the South African National Security 
Environment from 1990-2004: Challenges and Limitations," in Journal of Security Management, 
March, (2005), 10. 
175 Geoff Harris, Military Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Why guns cost more than butter, 
(Johannesburg: The Free Market Foundation, 2004), 4. 
176 Geoff Harris, The Irrationality of South Africa's Military Expenditure, (Durban: University of 
Natal, 2000), 3. 
177 Harris, 12. 
178 Military Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa, 24. 











However, what is clear is that the SAN and SAAF require at least minimal 
rearmament given their neglect over the past decade. The point of the matter is the 
nature of that rearmament and its financial burden on the state. 
What about Parliament's role on this issue? As far as the necessity of the SAP is 
concerned, one can distinguish between the necessity of the SAP as a whole and the 
necessity of some of the items procured. The contention is not with the former but 
with the latter. The SAP is the product of a decade long process characterized by 
intensive lobbying on the part of the DOD, influential members of cabinet and the 
ruling ANC, and more importantly foreign arms companies. The Constitution requires 
that the SANDP be a modem and technologically advanced force. This is fleshed out 
in the Defence White Paper and Review. The SAP is inherently flawed due to the 
acceptance by the White Paper and the Defence Review of conventional external 
defense as the primary mission of the SANDF. The reality is very different as the 
SANDP is primarily engaged in its secondary missions. However, Parliament 
approved both the White Paper and the Defence Review and therefore effectively 
approved conventional defense. Moreover, this point was inspired by the Constitution 
in order to ensure that the military stay out of partisan politics. Subsequently, the 
point is not to assess whether a procurement program should have been implemented 
or not, but rather to assess whether Parliament exercised oversight over this program 
in the interest of South Africa and it  citizens. Given the acceptance of conventional 
defense, the SAP was a necessary result of years of degeneration of the SANDP and 
its equipment. 
Parliament approved in principle the rearmament of the SAAP and SAN by approving 
the Review policy. By adopting the Defence Review, Parliament approved a 
determined design and structure of the SANDF. This design included jet fighters and 
submarines. An important cog in the machine of parliamentary oversight is expertise. 
Parliament's approval of the Defence Review is due to its lack of expertise in matters 
relating to defence. The JSCD and PSCD were involved in the formulation of this 
policy, which laid the foundation for the SAP process. However, these committees 
were newly established and consisted of inexperienced members with regards to the 
technical matters of defence. To this day Parliament lacks a research capacity that 











of the control is weakened by a lack of capacity. Moreover, given the operational 
reality of the SANDF, the Gripens and submarines have equipped the SANDF for the 
wrong mission. 
One can hold Parliament accountable for approving policy that necessitated the 
procurement of jet fighters and submarines for the SAAF and SAN respectively. A 
greater understanding of the SANDF's present and future operational requirements 
would undoubtedly have compelled the JSCD to reject the recommended design in the 
Defence Review. Admittedly this is only speculation, but the point remains valid. To 
its defense, Parliament approved the design on the basis that all procurement should 
be subject to the constraints of available funding, but this is exactly where oversight 
was sorely lacking within the SAP process. 
4.5 Criticism Two: Assessing the affordability 
4.5.1 Alternatives 
The SAP has been vehemently defended as a necessary purchase. Fighter jets and 
submarines aside there are stronger arguments for the corvettes and the utility 
helicopters. However, many observers have noted that although they do not question 
the necessity of these items, they very well do question the affordability of the 
contracts chosen. This is especially the case with the Hawk trainer contract. 
Moreover, the South African government has received even greater criticism as to the 
financing of the deal itself. Many have argued that the SAP has placed South Africa in 
a precarious financial position as the government had to undertake loans from foreign 
banks in order to finance the SAP. 
David Botha argues that as a percentage of GDP, the SAP is well below international 
norms highlighting that the Defence Review accepted 1,8% of GDP was required to 
pay for acquisitions and operating costs. He adds that the original hardware 
requirement was even lowered in order to make the SAP more affordable.18o See the 
table below. 











Equipment Planned Actual 
Gripen 38 28 
Hawk 24 24 
Corvettes 5 4 
Submarines 4 3 
Helicopters 60 30 
Table 2 181 
Of all the tenders that were considered the final successful contracts were the ones 
that scored the highest points in tenns of perfonnance, price, the industrial 
participation benefits and available financing. However, the Hawk trainer contract 
was not the best in tenns of price. The Italian made Aennacchi MB 339, a highly 
rated machine, was half the price of the Hawk trainer. British Aerospace however, 
added a larger amount of offsets to the Hawk tender. The Brits offered $1,2 billion 
compared to the $431 million on offer from the Italians and this is what tipped the 
balance in the favour of the British.182 Many argued that because the Hawk, designed 
as both a trainer and combat fighter, was only required as a training platfonn for 
SAAF recruits it was an unnecessary option. The Hawk would unlikely be used in a 
combat role by the SAAF, and thus a cheaper trainer such as the MB339 was the 
better choice. 183 
If this is so, what explains the preference for the Hawk? Wrigley argues that because 
the Hawk and the Gripen were both connected to British Aerospace, the South 
African government saw greater value in choosing the British contract for reasons of 
foreign policy. Even though the Italian, Czech and Gennan tenders were cheaper.184 
Seemingly South Africa's interest would have been to secure the British deal as this 
guaranteed that a struggling BAE would have been more willing than any other tender 
to buy into the local defence industry, thus effectively 'rescuing' the South African 
government of this liability. This is in fact what has happened since the SAP was 
signed. Miller argues that these are tactics central to Britain's defence industry's 
181 Ibid. 46. 
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attempts to increase its arms exports, with the endorsement of the British government. 
These tactics include: 
"A willingness to facilitate offset deals; the use of aid in underwriting arms sales; 
and the provision of a subsidy for sales to developing countries in the form of 
disproportionate amounts of credit for military, as opposed to civil, exports. "J85 
The anns exporters receive assistance form the British government through the 
Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO). They advise companies on markets 
and facilitate access to overseas decision-makers (my emphasis).186 Thus, political 
and economic interests were far more influential in the success of the BAE tender for 
the LIFf contract. 
This view is supported by Ferreira who argues that the Russians were willing to 
provide a package deal that consisted of MIG jet fighters, training aircraft and 
submarines at a much cheaper price. I87 One can only assume that the Russian bid 
received a lukewann reception from the South African government because the 
Russian Federation is outside of the Western European economic club, as well as 
being less attractive in terms of offset arrangements. Moreover, the Spanish and 
Italian bids for the corvette contract were cheaper than the German bid. Wrigley has 
claimed that if one looks at the distribution of the contracts the main suppliers are 
Germany, Britain, Italy and Sweden. These are all Western European powers and 
major trading partners of South Africa, although France has been a major loser in the 
bidding process. 
However, the French company Thales has been given the right to provide the 
electronics for the Westland Super-Lynx maritime helicopters that are to serve aboard 
the corvettes.188 Note that these helicopters do not form part of the SAP, but will be 
185 Miller, 5. 
186 Ibid. 5. 
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purchased in the near future. Also, rumours are that a future acquisition of main battle 
tanks for the SA Army would see the French-made LeClerc as the favoured option for 
the SANDF. 189 However, given BAE's substantial offset arrangements with South 
Africa, such a deal is more likely to be granted to BAE's subsidiary Vickers, which 
produces the Challenger 2.190 In any event it is clear that cheaper alternatives existed 
to the actual contracts that were signed. The only issues separating these were the 
promise of more attractive offset arrangements and the South African government's 
preference for European suppliers. 
What of the cost of the SAP deal in real terms? The price of the SAP, as reported to 
the public by Cabinet, was a total of R29, 9 billion. The price breakdown is below. 
Value 
Equipment Suppliers Quantity Rm 
German Frigate 
Corvettes Consortium 4 R5,473 
Submarines Ferrostaal, Germany 3 R4,289 
Light Utility 
Helicopters Augusta, Italy 25 R1,532 
Gripen Fighter Jets SAAB/BAE Consortium 28 R9,952 
Hawk Trainer/Fighter BAE, UK 24 R3,728 
Table 3 191 
However, this total was the price of the SAP, and excluded finance charges, escalation 
clauses and foreign exchange fluctuations. l92 The actual cost in real terms would be 
far greater. At the moment the cost of the SAP is in excess of R60 billion due to the 
depreciation of the Rand against the Dollar. 193 February makes an interest analysis 
that gives greater clarity of the costs involved: 
189 Wrigley, 11. 
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to the state of repaying the loans to these banks. 










"By comparison. for example, the annual health and welfare budget of the Eastern 
Cape Province is approximately R8, 5 billion. The expenditure of public funds on 
arms thus represents in excess of six years of that health and welfare budget ... 194 
59 
Four committees were established to evaluate and score the various bids. The 
Affordability Committee (AC) was established by the Department of Finance and was 
charged with assessing the cost of the SAP in the long run and whether it ascertaining 
the financial and economic risks attached. The AC reported that on signing the SAP, 
the government would be committing the state to finance payments up until 2013, 
which would be a long term obligation with hidden implications. They emphasized 
three risks. 
Firstly, the Minister's Committee was warned that FOREX rate fluctuations could 
dramatically increase the costs to the state. Secondly, the offset arrangements were 
subject to suspicion as they could not be guaranteed nor strictly enforced. Thirdly, it 
was not possible to understand the full implications of the interest attached to the 
financing loans. On this the AC viewed the SAP as having a high level of financial 
risk to the state with little or no guarantee that the offset arrangements would 
materialize, thus alleviating the negative impact on the South African economy.195 
Nonetheless Cabinet, based on the endorsement of the Minister's Committee, 
approved the signing of the SAP. Even though the financial impact of the SAP on the 
states coffers will be enormous, the real cost of the SAP will be seen in the lack of 
state funding for poverty alleviation. 196 Nathan goes further to say that in signing the 
SAP, government had reneged on its pledge in the White Paper to contain defence 
spending. 197 
Parliament should not have managed the SAP process that is the preserve of cabinet 
and the presidency. One could however, question why Parliament was not informed of 
194 Ibid. 4. 
195 Ibid. 8. 
196 See Robert Mattes, "South Africa: Democracy without the People?" in Journal of Democracy, Vol 
13, No.1 (2002),24. 
197 See Laurie Nathan, "Parliamentary approval of original Defence Review was no mandate to buy 











the possible financial implications of the SAP for the state. Most MPs knew as much 
about the financial issues within the SAP as the public. At no point was parliament 
made aware of the foreign exchange risks involved with the financing of the SAP. 
Most MPs were swayed by the promise of job creation and the massive foreign 
investment that would flow from the deal as a result of offset arrangements. The real 
costs of the SAP were not made public at the time and government informed both 
Parliament and the media that the SAP would cost R29, 9 billion. We now know that 
this is not SO.198 Even SCOPA stated that Cabinet had been fully aware of the 
possible financial implications and had a responsibility to inform the public 
accordingly, which it failed to dO. 199 Parliamentary oversight is virtually impossible 
without access to information, which in well funded legislatures such as the US 
Congress is made available via dedicated research staff. In the case of the SAP, 
Parliament was not fully informed so as to take steps it might have deemed fit at the 
time. Whether this means that Parliament would have rejected the SAP is a moot 
point, because Parliament was never requested to approve the SAP. 
4.5.2 'Offsets' 
If the SAP was laden with so much cost and risk, why did the Minister's Committee 
endorse signing the contracts? When asked this same question most government 
officials' response includes a reference to the massive benefits that the SAP deal will 
bring to the South African economy. Thus, it is imperative that we assess the offset 
arrangements as these seem to be contested ground amongst both advocates and 
opponents of the SAP. 
Offsets, otherwise known as industrial participation (IP) programs in the international 
defence industry, are used by arms companies to provide incentives to the purchasing 
state and to compensate the loss of work within that country on the arms transfers. 
Since 1996 South Africa has maintained a mandatory policy of national industrial 
participation (NIP). The aim is to use government procurement as a mechanism to 
create economic and industrial benefits. Thus, when government departments and 
~(a(e-owned en(emn'~e~ procure foreign ~unn(ie" to tnp: va(llP: of '((a ml·UI·on. I't 
becomes obligatory that the foreign supplier provide offset arrangements in the form 
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of investment into the domestic economy.200 ARMSCOR also has a Defence 
Industrial Participation (DIP) policy that requires offsets for similar value 
procurement concentrating local defence industries.201 All NIP projects are managed 
and monitored by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and DIP is the 
jurisdiction of the DOD and ARMSCOR.202 
Two criticisms are important here. One is the enforceability of the offset agreements, 
and the other is whether they actually alleviate the economic impact of massive 
expenditures of state funds. 
Often governments include certain clauses in offsets agreements that include a penalty 
if IP is not forthcoming. However, arms companies take this into account and increase 
the price of the arms transfers accordingly to make up for a possible fine. Moreover, it 
would be difficult for any government such as South Africa's to hold an arms 
company accountable for their IP commitments in a court of law. Within the SAP the 
government attached a 10% of the value of the tender penalty on most contracts. 
However, arms companies could very well just pay the fine and extricate themselves 
from having to honour their offset commitments?03 Interestingly, the Apartheid 
government experienced this when Israel reneged on its offset commitments in the 
1970s after having supplied the SAN's Warrior class fast attack craft (FAC)?04 To its 
credit the SCOPA queried the enforceability of the offsets within the SAP during its 
public hearings and indicated that the value of the penalties was too small in 
comparison to the value of the offsets?05 BAE, hailed as having been the best 
provider of offsets, combined both the Hawk and Gripen offset projects in order to 
lessen the amount of investment into the South African economy. SAABIBAE had up 
200 "South Africa's Defence Industry: Charting a New Course," 8. 
20) David Botha, "Offsetting the Costs of SA's Strategic Defence Package," ISS Paper 75, (July 
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until 2002 only made investments totalling £100 million out of a promised £1, 3 
billion.206 
Nonetheless, by August of 2002, offset arrangements were ahead of schedule 
indicating that the some arms companies intend to honour their commitments to South 
Africa. However, Wrigley argues that even if this is the case and all offsets 
commitments are discharged within the allocated period, the quality of the offsets are 
still up for debate. He notes that many critics describe the offsets as investments that 
would have taken place without the SAP?07 Seemingly, one cannot dismiss the offsets 
as 'empty promises' but it is true that the positive implications for the South African 
economy and average citizen were exaggerated. And this is worrying given that 
offsets were the ace held by government to convince the South African tax payer that 
the SAP was in their best interest. Moreover, arms companies are notorious for their 
lack of business ethics and profit ambitions, thus it does not make sense that arms 
companies would spend more than the value of their tenders just in order to 'seal the 
deal.' 
On the other hand many advocates have pointed out that offsets are being honoured 
and are benefiting the South African economy. Leon Engelbrecht argues that offsets 
investments, particularly in the local defence industry, are being discharged. He points 
out that the offsets attached to the SAP have in fact saved many local defence 
companies from bankruptcy and have turned many others into profitable concerns. 
Such companies include Grintek and Denel who have as a result of offsets been 
offered various contracts to supply Bahrain and Hungary.208 Much of the 
government's arguments for the SAP centered round the benefits that would accrue to 
the economy in terms of investment. The creation of 65 00 jobs as a result was used as 
a legitimating instrument for a public concerned about a level of unemployment 
reaching 40% figures. The Coalition of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has 
responded that even though the SAP and attached offsets have generated employment, 
this employment has benefited the wrong demography. Unemployment amongst black 
South Africans is largely attributed to a skills shortage and thus any economic boom 
206 See David Leigh, "The sordid truth behind an arms deal," The Guardian( UK), (17 July 2002). 
207 Wrigley, 13. 











within the skills intensive defence industry is unlikely to impact on this 
demographic.209 COSATU went further to criticize offsets as capital intensive and 
benefiting an industry that is predominantly located within Gauteng Province. 
"The defence industrial participation projects will aggravate the dichotomies in the 
economy and not narrow them. Furthermore, to the extent they mobilise local capital 
into a fairly capital-intensive sector, they will actually limit employment 
creation. ,,2JO 
Strategic arms acquisitions, according to leading defence industry economists is not 
an effective means of creating jobs. Harris argues that the price tag of the SAP, which 
is R30 million, means that each of the promised 65 000 jobs came at a price of R460 
000 each. That same amount of money could employ between five and six educators 
or nursing staff.211 
Offsets have been widely rejected as having enough economic impact so as to 
alleviate the negative impact of arms purchases on the economy. Critics of the 
international arms trade have argued that offsets are an international phenomenon that 
is nothing more than empty promises. They argue that offsets actually increase the 
price of arms acquisition, are very difficult to monitor and provide opportunities for 
corruption.212 What has been accepted by many economists is that offsets via arms 
purchases can have a positive impact on economic growth. However, economic 
growth is very different to economic development, the former referring to a monetary 
increase in the size of a nation's economy as measured by GDP.z13 The latter is more 
complex and intense and takes into consideration more relevant things such as 
distribution of economic benefits and access to resources.214 South Africa is an 
209 COSATU, "The Arms Deal and Employment Creation," submitted to Portfolio Committee on 
Trade and Industry, (6 February 20ot), 2. 
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example of what is known as a 'Less Developed Country' or LDC. Although much of 
its economic muscle is characteristic of a 'More Developed Country' or MDC, much 
of its society is ravaged by economic problems characteristic of a LDC. 
Thus, closer inspection of the SAP and its offset agreements point to a belief amongst 
South Africa's political and business leaders that foreign arms procurement can be a 
vehicle for economic growth. This belief is nothing new and has been held by many 
other countries in similar stages of economic development, namely Brazi1.21S This 
view sees growth in two ways. First, the local arms industry expands as a result of 
foreign investment, licensing and co-production. Second, local arms companies 
acquire foreign markets in which to promote their products. Governments prefer to 
spend domestically and offsets provide them with a means to channel funds back into 
the domestic economy. Moreover, the international tendency is that countries align 
politically and economically with those countries from whom they purchase 
expensive armaments.216 Thus, much of the Strategic Arms Package had to do with 
South Africa's military industrial complex. The ANC government views this industry, 
along with minerals and energy, as a strategic vehicle for which to drive economic 
growth. 
Also, the merger between DENEL, British Aerospace and Thomson CSF would most 
definitely have occurred without the carrot of the SAP. The latter two companies 
needed the merger more than DENEL, given the contraction within the international 
arms industry.217 
Offsets do not provide investment in housing, medical centres, schools or in the 
agricultural sector. The biggest recipient of non-military industrial participation 
attached to the SAP has been the minerals and energy sector. The SAP therefore 
214 Lloyd Dumas, "Weapons Procurement and Development: Do offsets Mitigate or Magnify the 
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the military ensuring the transition to democracy. The DOD outguns both the 
executive and Parliament with regards to knowledge of the defence sector. The 
Defence White Paper, Defence Review and other government legislation require that 
the DOD pursue its acquisitions policy within the general framework of the state's 
financial policy. The DOD is obligated to keep costs to a minimum given South 
Africa's socio-economic problems. It failed in this regard as there were cheaper 
alternatives to the Hawk, and the submarines and Gripens were an extravagance. 
Given its dominant share of defence sector knowledge it was incumbent on the DOD 
to advise government and Parliament as to the most affordable options. 
4.6.2 The Presidency and Cabinet 
The executive's role within the SAP was to sell the SAP to Parliament and civil 
society. The executive promised the creation of 65 000 jobs, though most of those 
jobs are within a capital intensive and high skills defence industry, thus leaving the 
unskilled and unemployed out of the equation. FDI was also used as a carrot to 
manufacture legitimacy for the SAP, even though there is no guarantee that these 
foreign companies will pay up or that there investment is actually related to the SAP 
at all. The executive was an active participant in the SAP in that it negotiated directly 
with foreign governments like Britain and Germany, who are South Africa's main 
European trade partners and source of FDI. The SAP was a means to attract FDI and 
gain access to foreign markets. 
Through the SAP government could give South Africa more status within the 
international community and be able to become the West's main partner in security in 
Africa. Moreover, within the context of the SAP we see South Africa's quasi military 
economic complex. This is the area where business meets politics. The offset 
agreements included empowerment deals and this did much to sweeten the SAP for 
the most influential leaders in business, government and the military. The SAP is a 
financial risk to South Africa's growing economy and does very little for economic 
development. Government's responsibility and obligation is to manage the economy 
with as little risk as possible. The SAP could very well prove to be extremely costly 












Parliament did in fact approve the Defence Review with the force design option that 
included a conventional core force. Government and the DOD's assertions that this is 
tantamount to an approval of the arms deal are false. Parliament approved of an ideal 
design given financial constraints. Moreover, Parliament was not in an informed 
enough position to make that approval of the Defence Review. Parliament lacks the 
research support and expertise to counter the wealth of defence sector knowledge held 
by the DOD. The DOD through lobbying and the lobbying of foreign arms companies 
were able to influence Parliamentarians.219 Although not all Parliamentarians were 
convinced, the nature of party discipline and the list electoral system ensured that 
MPs 'towed the line.' MPs were also impressed by the promised offsets in the form of 
employment and FDI. However, if they had the expertise or the research capacity, 
they would have been able to counter these assertions by the arms industry, the DOD 
and government. 
What is clear is that the SAP essentially was covered by developmental rhetoric, 
emphasising job creation and economic growth. Many were seduced by these 
arguments but in the end they hold little, if any, water. 
4.6.4 The Arms Industry 
The success of the conventional core force option during the Defence Review was 
important to the arms industry, as this would ensure the rearmament of the SANDF. 
Both the domestic and international defence industries played there part by lobbying 
Parliament and government since the early days of South Africa's new democracy. 
Both the international and domestic arms industry had a huge stake in the successful 
agreement of the SAP. Local arms companies received FDI and defence technology, 
as well as a foothold in the international arms market. Foreign firms like BAE were 
able to invest locally thus securing for themselves the ability to 'close the deal' on any 
future arms contracts with South Africa. International arms companies took advantage 
of a fledgling South Africa within the world of the arms trade. Although to their credit 
South Africa's government drove a very hard bargain, they were nonetheless a bit out 












of their depth in terms of expertise in arms trade negotiations etc. ARMS COR and the 
DOD were the only sectors of the state that had the ability to correctly advise 
government and Parliament but failed to do so as their interest mirrored the interest of 
the international arms industry. 
Three things can be concluded here. First, the primary mission of the SANDF is in 
fact a very distant possibility given South Africa's military dominance in the region. 
Nonetheless, from the view of democracy the military is best kept out of partisan 
politics. Thus, conventional defence as the primary mission of the SANDF is not the 
problem. Rather, considering the extravagance of the Gripens and submarines, the 
SAP is flawed. The SANDF has been equipped for the wrong mission. The SANDF 
is primarily involved in what are called its secondary missions, such as peace 
operations and support of the SAPS, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable 
future. 
Second, strategic arms acquisitions are a form of economic and foreign policy. 
Domestically, the SAP provided an opportunity for government and business to 
coalesce their interests. Also, the SAP ensured that the military (SANDF) was 
rewarded for its role in the transition to South Africa's democracy, thus strengthening 
the stability of the new democratic dispensation. Externally, the SAP provided an 
opportunity for the domestic defence industry and other South African commodities to 
gain access to foreign markets. The South African government was less concerned 
about what arms it bought than who it bought arms from. 
Third, legislative oversight over arms acquisitions in new democracies is fraught with 
difficulty. Strategic acquisition programs are an expensive undertaking that require 
that the state concerned have a wealth of civilian expertise on the defence sector. This 
is not the case in fledgling democracies like South Africa where the military hold 












5. THE IMPACT OF THE SAP ON DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This final chapter focuses on the aftermath of the signing of the SAP deals. This saga 
has come to be known as the Arms Deal scandal referring to the many allegations of 
corruption and bribery that have surfaced in the wake of the SAP. The purpose of the 
chapter is to investigate the role of only two defence sector actors within this saga, 
namely Parliament and the executive. 
The chapter is organized into two sections. The first section looks at the Standing 
Committee for Public Accounts (SCOPA) initial reactions to the Auditor-General's 
investigation into the SAP. This reaction resulted in the Joint Investigation Team 
(JIT). This section discusses these events with a view to understanding the third main 
criticism of the SAP that concerns the allegations of corruption. The second section 
investigates the JIT Report and Parliament's reaction to that report. This section seeks 
to understand the effect of the SAP on South Africa's democratic institutions. This is 
the fourth main criticism of the SAP and concerns the question whether the SAP 
corruption saga has rendered Parliament a 'rubber stamp' body with very little power 
over government. Thus, this chapter focuses on issues of Parliamentary oversight, 
transparency and general good governance. This saga has been the most important 
litmus test of the state of South Africa's democracy and the quality of its democratic 
civilian control over defence. 
5.2 Criticism Three: Lobbying and Corruption 
"It seems that certain individuals are not satisfied with a single bout of 
empowerment. Instead, they are the beneficiaries of repeated bouts of re-
empowerment. " -- ANC Secretary_General Kgalema Motlanthe, on black economic 
empowerment. 
"For evil to prosper, good men must remain silent" -Martin Luther King Jr and 
Schabir Shaik. 
There are three cases of corruption that are important in this section. The first case 











Schabir Shaik. The third case centers round legal proceeding launched by Richard 
Young, owner of the company C2F. 
The office of the Auditor-General (AG) had launched an investigation into the SAP 
based on the premise that the SAP was a high risk audit area. The review was quite 
comprehensive making findings about several aspects of the SAP.220 These aspects 
were highlighted as requiring an investigation. The review addressed first the 
independence of various actors that were involved in the procurement deal. Secondly, 
it addressed the evaluation of the LIFT project. Third, it addressed the guarantees 
connected to the NIP. Fourth, the procurement policy of the MOD especially with 
regards to the SAP itself. Fifth, it investigated the negotiations with regards to the 
procurement of the corvettes. Sixth, it was concerned about the tender process relating 
to the awarding of sub-contracts.221 
The Special Review was handed to SCOP A for debate. The subsequent report by 
SCOPA to the NA suggested that, given the seriousness of the Auditor-General's 
concerns and the amount of expenditure involved in the SAP, that a meeting between 
the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NPA) and the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) be established to 
formulate a forensic investigation into these issues. The Joint Investigation Team 
(JIT) was to be the brainchild of a series of such meetings.222 It is important to note 
that the intention of SCOP A in calling for forensic investigation was not to question 
the merits of the SAP itself, but rather to question the merits of procurement processes 
involved.223 
There were three parts to the JIT process. The first part involved a criminal 
investigation into certain allegations of corruption and conflicts of interest within the 
SAP process that were brought to the attention of the JIT. The NP A criminal 
220 Auditor-General, Special Review of the Selection Process of Strategic Defence Packages for the 
Acquisition of Armaments at the Department of Defence, (Pretoria: Auditor-General, 2000), 3. 
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investigation was carried out by its Directorate: Special Operations or commonly 
known as the Scorpions. The DSO team was divided into four sub-teams. Two sub-
teams dealt with the arms procurement process, whilst the other two concerned 
themselves with the allegations of conflicts of interest. 224 Of the allegations that were 
investigated, many were found to be of no substance. Other allegations were 
substantive and were to have serious repercussions for those persons implicated. 
This was especially so in the case of Tony Yengeni, a former Chairperson of the 
lSCD. Yengeni was investigated by the Scorpions for having received a luxury 
vehicle at a reduced price from Daimler-Benz South Africa, a successful contractor in 
the SAP. Yengeni was accused of having endorsed the bid of Daimler-Benz during 
the bid process of the SAP in exchange for heavy discount on the vehicle, whilst he 
was the Chairman of the lSCD. He was eventually arrested on charges of fraud and 
corruption, to which he pleaded gUilty on the second charge on the basis that the State 
withdraw the charge of corruption against him. His appeal against his sentence of 4 
years imprisonment has since been overturned. The key point here is that Yengeni 
was one of the ANC's top MPs in Parliament and his conviction gave much weight to 
the 'corruption noise' that surrounds the SAP. A similar fate befell a senior official 
within the DTI. 225 Although there may have been instances of corruption and conflicts 
of interests throughout the SAP process, the DSO investigation found that there was 
no evidence to support the claim that corruption could have undermined the SAP 
contracts as a whole?26 
The second part of the lIT process was carried out by the office of the Public 
Protector, much of which was conducted in public. The lIT did this because of the 
massive amount of public interest in the 'arms deal scandal,' and its concerns for the 
transparency and legitimacy of the investigation. Moreover, the criminal and forensic 
audit investigation of the DSO and the AG respectively, dealt with sensitive 
information and the Public Protector Act allowed for public investigations.227 
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The third part of the JIT, a forensic audit, was the responsibility of the AG. The AG 
established five sub-teams and each was given different duties to ensure time 
efficiency. All teams reported to a project manager. The forensic audit was very 
intense, many witnesses were interviewed and thousands of documents were studied. 
In fact this part of the JIT was hailed by many as a very thorough investigation in 
accordance with international norms pertaining to forensic investigations.228 
The final JIT Report was submitted on 15 November 2001 for the scrutiny of 
Parliament. The ruling ANC welcomed the report and in an online article, noted that 
the report states: 
"No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by the Government. 
The irregularities and improprieties ... point to the conduct of certain officials of the 
government departments involved and cannot ... be ascribed to the President or the 
Minister's involved in their capacity as members of the Minister's Committee or 
Cabinet. There are therefore no grounds to suggest that the Government's 
contracting position was flawed. ,,229(Bold print my own) 
This strong final statement concerning government's contracting position is for the 
larger part correct with a view to the various allegations of corruption and 
irregularities within the SAP. However, government's contracting position can be 
questioned in the sense that entering the SAP was a political choice, a choice between 
expenditure on social welfare or defence. Thus, a choice for which Parliament can and 
should hold government accountable. However this was discussed at length in the 
previous chapter. 
In a submission to Parliament, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South 
Africa (IDASA) stated that the several parliamentary committees were not equipped 
with enough research resources, time and contextual knowledge of the SAP in order 
to examine the JIT report?30 Moreover, it takes issue with Parliament's eventual 
adoption of the report citing many findings within the JIT to be insufficient and also 
228 Ibid. 13. 
229 ANC, "Arms Procurement: Briefing Note No.4," in ANC Today, (October 2003),3. 











highlights a few omissions from the report.231 IDASA also argues that the acceptance 
of the JIT report in no way spells the end of parliament's oversight obligations 
towards the SAP. The institute holds that it is constitutionally required that Parliament 
exercise continued oversight over the SAP especially with a view to the promised 
delivery of offsets.232 
Furthermore allegations have been made that the Auditor-General and the other 
Chapter Nine institutions that were involved in the JIT were complicit in the 
'sanitisation' of the JIT report. The AG was accused of having allowed the executive 
to doctor the report so as to negate any possible negative impact that the report might 
have on the image of the SAP?33 These allegations have resulted in court procedures 
against the AG by the owner of one of the former tenders in the SAP, C2P. The 
owner, Richard Young, wished the court to compel the AG to release confidential 
information that the JIT received during its investigations int  the SAP. The 
information apparently suggests that his company's tender had been the preferred bid 
by the DOD but subsequently lost out to the tender from Schabir Shaik's African 
Defence Systems (ADS), formerly known as Altech Defence Systems?34 Young won 
his case in 2003 and gained access to the documents which confirmed his allegations 
that the JIT Report had been 'doctored' to pr tect certain senior ANC members.235 
These events have done much to tarnish the public image of the Chapter Nine 
institutions, such as the AG. Whether they are legitimate allegations, that may be, but 
the point is that the fallout of the SAP has not left untouched those very institutions of 
state that are supposed to be the watchdogs of South Africa's democratic experiment. 
C2p was one of the domestic companies that had bid to supply the combat systems on 
the corvettes that were to be built by the GFC. The company ADS, of which Schabir 
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Shaik was both a director and shareholder, was also one of these bidders. Shaik's 
ADS was the successful tender for the combat suite and C2p was not successful. 
Richard Young launched court proceedings against the DOD and made complaints to 
the JIT about the procurement process for the combat suites. Young's main argument 
was that his company was the preferred choice by the SAN to supply the system, but 
that corruption and irregular practices confirmed DAS as the successful tender. 
Important to note is that the state's procurement policy holds that the main contractor, 
in this case GFC, is responsible for all subcontracts. However, these procurement 
procedures must adhere to those of both the State Tender Board and ARMSCOR. The 
JIT report finds that this was not the case and highlights many irregularities that it 
regards as unfair and not transparent.236 The DOD and ARMSCOR argued that they 
were not responsible for the awarding of the subcontracts and by implication are not 
responsible for any corrupt activities that took place. 
However, the JIT found that the DOD! ARMSCOR were indeed involved in these 
tendering procedures for two reasons. One that the SAN owned R20 million worth of 
technology being developed by C2P, and two that Schabir Shaik's brother Shamin 
'Chippy' Shaik was the head of DOD acquisitions at the time of the procurement 
process and had failed to properly recuse himself from relevant meetings?37 Shamin 
Shaik was eventually fired as Head of Acquisitions for these 'irregularities.'238 
Moreover, Shamin Shaik has been accused of having links with various companies 
who were beneficiaries of the SAP?39 The report goes further to find that the C2P bid 
was indeed preferred by the SAN240 and that confidential information of his tender 
was forwarded to ADS 241 and unfairly compromised his company's competitive 
advantage. 242 
236 JIT Report, 309. 
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On the adoption of the JIT report, the government regarded the investigation into the 
SAP as effectively closed. However, ever since allegations of corruption within the 
tendering process for sub-contracts have surfaced regularly?43 Consequently, highly 
important and influential figures have since been criminally charged with corruption 
resulting in high profile court cases characterized by cinematic drama. The most 
notable trial has been that of Schabir Shaik, former financial advisor to the former 
Deputy President Jacob Zuma and brother to the former head of DOD Acquisitions 
Divisions, Chippy Shaik?44 
In 2005 Shaik was convicted of "having a generally corrupt relationship" with Jacob 
Zurna, which eventually led to the dismissal of Zuma as the country's Deputy 
President by President Mbeki. Zuma now faces charges of corruption later this year. 
The main issue here was that Shaik had solicited 'protection' from Zuma for the 
French arms company Thales, formerly known as Thomson-CSF from the JIT 
investigation, and especially from SCOPA. Note that Thales has a stake in Shaik's 
company African Defence Systems (ADS) through the DIP, and that ADS was a 
successful sub-contractor in the SAP. The damning evidence was a scathing letter 
from Zuma, in his position as Deputy President and Head of Government Business in 
Parliament, to the Chairman of SCOPA in exchange for an annual 'loan' of R500 000 
from Thales to Zuma facilitated by Shaik. 
His conviction is related to corruption during the JIT investigation and hearings held 
by SCOP A into the 'Arms Deal. The conviction is not related to corruption within the 
Arms Deal itself. 245 
fairness of the procurement of the corvette combat suite given that the main contractor was essentially 
sub-contracting a partner outside of normal DOD! ARMSCOR procurement procedures. 
242 Ibid. 302. 
243 Chiara Carter, "Senior Defence Official in Arms Corruption Scandal," City Press. (7 February 
2000). 
244 Note the past tense used here indicating that all have since been fired. 
245 These events nonetheless, add much fuel to the smoke that the Arms Deal produces on an almost 
weekly basis. What is clear is that much of the future of the Arms Deal corruption saga should be 











5.3 Criticism Four: A rubber stamp Parliament? 
"The custom oj posing sweetheart questions to the executive perpetuates a tradition 
within the ANC, as one observer crassly put it, oj Jarting each other warm. "-
Commentator, Rhoda Kadalie on what she said was the lack of independent thinking 
in Parliament. 
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The inclusion of the SIU headed by Judge Heath in the JIT was to be the cause of 
political fallout between members of SCOPA, the NA and the Presidency. This 
debacle was thus far the toughest test of South Africa's political institutions, 
especially Parliament's muscle with a view to the executive. February notes that prior 
to the SIU debacle, SCOPA enjoyed much success as a parliamentary committee with 
regards to oversight. The committee was characterized by a serious concern for public 
expenditure and along with the technical expertise afforded by the office of the 
Auditor-General SCOPA was able to deliver quality oversight over public expenditure 
compared to pre_1994.246 The controversy began when a proclamation was not 
granted by the Presidency for the SIU to be part of the JIT.247 It is important to note 
here that the Public Protector and the Auditor-General are constitutionally enacted 
investigative institutions, whilst the DSO falls under the National Prosecuting 
Authority of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
The SIU, on the other hand was a special commission of investigation tasked with 
tackling corruption especially in the Eastern Cape Province. Opposition MPs, 
especially the then Chairman of the SCOPA Gavin Woods, argued that it was 
SCOP A' s wish that the SIU form part of the JIT and that this had been made clear in 
its Fourteenth Report. Naturally ANC MPs on SCOPA were obliged to take a 
different view once the feelings of the ANC Presidency were made known. And here 
is where the inherent difficulty of exercising oversight over the executive in a party-
list electoral system is made clear. ANC MPs, such as Andrew Feinstein, who had 
earlier supported the inclusion of the SIU were now forced to backtrack as the ANC 
presidency was not of the same view. In fact to illustrate the powerlessness of party 
MPs against party discipline, Feinstein was eventually replaced as head of the ANC 
246 February, 4. 
247 South African Government, Statement by the Director General in the Presidency on behalf oj 












study group on SCOP A. This debacle points to the arguments of countless 
commentators who have accused the ANC leadership, including the Presidency, of a 
too centralized leadership style intolerant of criticism. This 'rebellion' by the ANC 
caucus in Parliament caused great consternation amongst the ANC National executive 
Committee which insisted that MPs must 'tow the party line.'248 Even the opposition 
party, the Democratic Alliance, replaced its MPs with higher ranking party 
heavyweights who lacked a working knowledge of both the SAP and the SCOPA.249 
These events show that it is not so much one-party dominance than it is party 
executive dominance that is the problem. 
Woods had even written a letter to President Thabo Mbeki to request that the 
Presidency issue a proclamation allowing the SIU to join the JIT. He was later 
reprimanded for the letter by former Speaker of the NA, Frene Ginwala. A 
constitutional question directly related to parliament's role of oversight is raised by 
this event. February notes that the understanding of oversight meant that Parliament 
hold the executive to account. But the understanding of how that accountability was to 
be enforced was the subject of much political and legal wrangling inside and outside 
of Parliament. 250 
"Patricia De Litle's understanding of accountability suggested that Parliament had 
'instructed' the executive to grant the SIU a proclamation. As the Speaker rightly 
pointed out ... this would be of dubious legal and constitutional validity. ,,251 
In other words Parliament can only instruct the executive via legislation, but the 
executive is obligated to account (read explain) for its doings in the pursuit of this 
legislation to Parliament. The main point here is not whether Parliament should have 
been able to instruct the executive. This would be tantamount to micro-management 
on the part of Parliament and lead to the debilitation of the Constitutional principle of 
separation of powers. The main point is that the SCOP A broke down, and its 
oversight capacity along with it, when its member MPs were not able to publicly 
248 Gumede, 300-303. 
249 February, 4. 
250 Ibid. 5. 











disagree with their respective political parties, because of party discipline and the 
party list electoral system. ANC MP Andrew Feinstein proved to be the main casualty 
when his criticism of the ANC's dealing of the lIT probe failed to stand up to the will 
of the ANC's executive. 
At the end of the day, the lIT only consisted of the DSO, the Public Protector and the 
Auditor-General. Mathisen notes that the ANC, like any other party, exercises 
discipline over it MPs through various means. The most important of which is via the 
role of the party whip who ensures that all MPs pursue party policy as formulated by 
the ANC's National working Committee and National Executive?52 The replacement 
of Feinstein illustrates many commentators concerns of centralization of party and 
state power in the hands of the ANC National Executive and, more importantly, the 
Presidency respectively.253 Gumede talks of a culture of muzzling any criticism from 
within the party and viciously attacking any from outside. He mentions the lack of 
debate within party structures especially within the Parliamentary caucus.254 Even the 
official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, has been accused of similar practice. 
Thus, Parliamentarians have no freedom to represent the interest of taxpayers over the 
will of their respective parties. Mattes goes further arguing that rigorous 
parliamentary oversight ANC MPs invariably would be tantamount to criticism of 
ANC senior leadership. Also constitutional provisions allow that disloyal MPs can be 
replaced with loyal ones thus effectively prohibiting any possible vote of no 
confidence in the executive by Parliament. 255 The vote of no confidence is 
Parliament's only constitutional mechanism to effect both the separation of powers 
and the supremacy of Parliament itself. Thus, SCOPA was effectively hamstrung by 
the electoral system present in South Africa, thus negating its capacity to exercise its 
constitutional obligation of oversight. 
252 Mathisen and Tj0nneland, 9. 
253 Ibid. 10. 
254 Gumede, 304. 











5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
5.4.1 The Presidency and Cabinet 
The lIT found little evidence that confirmed opposition parties' and certain sections 
of civil society's assertions that the SAP was an entirely corrupt process. In other 
words, there was no direct link made between the SAP process and corruption. 
Nonetheless, the lIT and Parliament's investigations only dealt with 5 percent of the 
SAP and given the amount of smoke these probes drew, a full scale investigation into 
the entire SAP would prove to be very interesting to say the least. 
One instance of alleged irregularities is highlighted by the lIT report. This refers to 
the czP tender for the combat suite on the corvette. It has been confirmed that the 
DOD preferred this bid, but eventually chose the bid of Shaik's company, ADS. The 
conflict of interest is stark when one considers that Shaik's brother, Chippy, was the 
head of the DOD's acquisitions department at the time and failed to recuse himself 
from relevant meetings discussing these tenders.256 
However, it is in the response to the lIT where we see corruption within government. 
The conviction of Shaik and the dismissal of Zuma as the country's Deputy President 
related to a corrupt relationship between these two and the French arms company 
Thales. These allegations are related to the lIT and SCOPA's investigations and not 
the SAP acquisition process itself. Nonetheless, the main negative effect that the SAP 
has had on the executive is that it made these institutions vulnerable to the aggressive 
lobbying and corruption of unscrupulous arms dealers. It is well known that most 
arms deals involve corruption given the competition within the market. Moreover, the 
SAP afforded unscrupulous businessman the opportunity to seek 'protection' from 
high-ranking government officials. The SAP is a classic example of why business and 
politics are best kept as far apart as possible, or at least kept under close supervision 
by Parliament and civil society. 
What is clear from the probes into the SAP is that the Presidency has centralized 
decision-making and essentially power within its office. Parliament has little if any 
256 Note that recent reports in the Mail and Guardian cite recent investigations by the German 
authorities on the German Frigate Consortium. The GFC is accused of having bribed numerous South 
African officials in order to secure the corvette bid, which was successful. These events cast a shadow 
over the SAP itself and have done much to reignite allegations that the SAP is the largest corruption 











influence over policy-making and MPs face strict disciplinary measures if they 
vigorously pursue their oversight obligations. Moreover, the disturbing link between 
highly influential business leaders and senior government leaders cannot be denied. 
The probe into the Anus Deal shows that government officials have become adept at 
buying influence over business and vice versa. 
5.4.2 Parliament 
The SAP provided arms companies and business people who stood to gain from the 
arms acquisition an opportunity to buy influence over MPs within key committees in 
Parliament by 'wining and dining' and giving 'gifts'. A case in point being the 
prosecution of Tony Yengeni, a former Chairperson of the lSCD, who is cited by 
many observers as having otherwise performed an exemplary role within the defence 
debate during the integration years of the SANDF. Corruption connected to the SAP 
has affected some of the leading MPs within Parliament. 
The lIT investigations into the SAP showed up the difficulty of effecting 
parliamentary oversight in a party list electoral system characterized by strict party 
discipline. Amongst both the ruling and opposition parties, MPs with an intimate 
knowledge of the SAP and the lIT process were removed from notably SCOPA and 
replaced with party heavyweights. This did much to weaken Parliament's response to 
the lIT Report and its ability to effectively counter the role of the executive in the 
state's reaction to the 'arms deal saga.' Moreover, the lIT Report also showed up 
Parliament's lack of a specialized research capacity and expertise in defence issues so 
as to maximize its response to the lIT Report and in its oversight inquiries over the 
DOD. 
On a more positive note, the aftermath of the SAP via the JIT process showed the 
relative strength of Parliament in the post-Apartheid era. In stark contrast to the days 
of Total Strategy, Parliament w~ free to hold public hearings and through its 
committee system set the ball rolling for the establishment of the JIT in the interests 
of transparency and accountability. In this regard Parliament passed a very important 
test in its freedom and constitutional independence under the separation of powers. 
Moreover, the courage displayed by many individual MPs across party lines in the 











pressure, also is a testament to how far parliament has come since the days of Total 
Strategy. Under the Apartheid regime an investigation like the lIT would have been 
unheard of and quite simply impossible. Having said this, much work needs to be 
done in order to strengthen parliament's oversight capacity as this is the only 
mechanism to ensure government's accountability for its decisions and this capacity 
remains Parliament's overriding weakness. 
Three things can be concluded here. First, power has increasingly been centralized in 
the executive in post-Apartheid South Africa. Parliament is unable to check executive 
dominance over defence issues. The political fallout over the investigation into the 
SAP shows that MPs are powerless in the face of strict party discipline exercised by 
the executive. This creates a lack of accountability within the executive and thus a 
significant weakening of legislative control over arms acquisitions in South Africa. 
Second, strategic arms acquisitions weaken democratic institutions and this is 
especially so in the new democracies of the Third Wave. They provide opportunities 
for grand corruption as these democracies have not yet strengthened their institutional 
capacity to manage such undertakings with minimal risk to democracy. 
Third, given the negative legacy of Apartheid and a fledgling democracy, South 
Africa possesses a resilient economy. The Bretton Woods institutions, namely the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have not voiced any displeasure at 
South Africa's SAP. In fact the silence is deafening. This and the willingness of 
foreign banks to enter into large loan agreements with the South African government 













6.1 Research Problem and Question 
The South African government entered into the Strategic Arms Package (SAP) or 
Arms Deal in 1999. This strategic arms acquisitions program has proven to be the 
single most controversial issue in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
The SAP is a series of major arms procurement contracts signed between the South 
African government and international arms suppliers. The contracts were lumped 
together into a 'package' intended to provide a more affordable deal for the 
government. The SAP was mostly financed through an intricate set of loans from 
foreign banks. In December 1999, the government announced that it had signed 
agreements with various suppliers to re-equip the SANDF, with the SAN and the 
SAAF being the chief beneficiaries of the SAP.257 The SAP consisted of five main 
contracts. 
The SAP has drawn incessant criticism from many quarters, most notably the 
opposition parties and civil society. The Arms Deal is the first strategic arms 
acquisition of its kind in South Africa. The cost of the SAP is staggering compared to 
any other arms acquisition program in South Africa's history. The SAP is also the first 
acquisition of this type under democracy in South Africa. Thus, the Arms Deal 
provides a timely opportunity to examine South Africa's defence in a democracy, of 
which legislative control over the military is the most important component. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to understand what the Arms Deal shows about 
security relations in a democratic South Africa and the impact it has had on legislative 
control over the military. The research question for the dissertation was: "What does 
the Strategic Arms Package saga between 1998 and 2005 show about legislative 
control over defence in South Africa?" This is a descriptive question and was chosen 
as the best way to user the Arms Deal as a window into legislative control over the 
military in South Africa. 
257 Judith February, "South Africa- Democracy and the South African Arms Deal," in Three Strikes 
against Graft commissioned case study for the ISS Anti-Corruption Strategies Programme, (Indaba 











6.2 Research Design and Analytical Approach 
The dissertation is an empirical critical analysis. Thus, a balanced assessment was 
sought as to what exactly transpired during the history of the Arms Deal between 
1998 and 2005. Through the 'window' of the SAP the study will attempted to 
highlight the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa's democratic institutions and 
other relevant role players. These aspects are crucial to a balanced critical analysis. 
Empirical accuracy was critical. Because of the noise surrounding the Arms Deal it 
was impossible to include everything. Thus, the dissertation only focused on the 
important things within the SAP. The study only included legal actions that have been 
completed with legal verdicts. The scope of the entire study stretches from the 
Apartheid era until the present year, 2006. 
The study consisted of four chapters excluding the introduction and conclusion. The 
chapters are divided according to the four main criticisms of the SAP: 
a) The necessity of the SAP 
b) The affordability of the SAP 
c) The allegations of corruption 
d) Parliament as a 'rubber stamp' body. 
6.3 Summary 
Chapter Two provided a historical survey of legislative control over arms acquisitions 
in South Africa. What is cl ar is that legislative oversight in a Parliamentary 
democracy is very difficult. Parliamentary executive democracies face a greater 
challenge in legislative control over the military than is the case in constitutional 
democracies with strict separation of powers. Sanctions strengthen executives and 
weaken legislatures. Sanctions also allow executives to centralise power over the 
state. A tradition of weak legislative oversight over arms acquisitions was developed 
under the Apartheid era. 
Chapter Three investigated legislative control over arms acquisitions in South Africa 
and the roles and responsibilities of the various role players. What became clear was 
that there are two types of arms acquisitions in South Africa. Routine/non-cardinal 
acquisition programs are common and require the approval of the Minister of 











controversial and require Cabinet approval. Parliament in democratic South Africa is 
weak in comparison to the Executive. Although formally institutionalised within the 
Constitution, the tradition of weak legislative control over the military has continued. 
Legislative control over the military is idealised as legislatures struggle to hold the 
executive and the military accountable. 
Chapter Four addressed the Arms Deal itself and the criticisms of military necessity 
and affordability. What is highlighted in this chapter is that the SAP equipped the 
SANDF for the wrong mission. The primary mission of conventional defence against 
external threat, although crucial in keeping the military out of politics, is a distant 
possibility. The SANDF is primarily involved in secondary missions of peace 
operations and support of the SAPS. Strategic arms acquisitions create stability 
amongst the elite as they provide an opportunity for government and business to wed 
their interests and reward the military for keeping out of politics. Legislative oversight 
over strategic arms acquisitions in new democracies is fraught with difficulty. They 
are an expensive undertaking that require that the state possess a wealth of civilian 
expertise on the defence sector, which is seldom the case in new democracies like 
South Africa. 
Chapter Five addressed the impact of the Arms Deal on South Africa's democratic 
institutions. The chapter showed that power has been centralized in the executive in 
post-Apartheid South Africa. Parliament is unable to check executive dominance over 
defence issues, which creates a lack of accountability within executive-legislature 
relations. This weakens legislative control over arms acquisitions in South Africa. 
Strategic arms acquisitions weaken democratic institutions in new democracies 
because of a lack of institutional capacity and make these institutions vulnerable to 










6.4 What the Arms Deal shows 
6.4.1 Defence in a Democracy: 
"/ would like to advise those who find it politically and strategically expedient to 
perpetuate the negative stereotype of the African, which we inherited from our past, 
to take the greatest care that they do not start a fire they cannot put out. But we too, 
the Africans, share a similar responsibility not to start fires that we cannot put out. " 
-South African President Thabo Mbeki 
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Indeed, the Strategic Arms Package has started a fire. South Africa has never 
completed large scale arms procurement in its history, especially not under a 
democracy. 
Large scale arms procurement needs democracy in order to be successful. Arms 
procurement deals like the SAP require legitimacy, and such legitimacy can only be 
manufactured under a democracy. One only has to look at the United States defence 
budget for the prime example of this. Many democracy theorists have argued that 
democracy needs modernisation. In other words the engine of democracy is fuelled by 
money, hence the blurring of lines between business and politics. 
Defence in a democracy is an expensive business. Large scale arms procurement 
keeps the military content and provides them with the means to prepare for future 
conflicts, thus lending legitimacy to the role of defence in society. The promise of 
rearmament was part of the metal that forged the alliance between the SADF and the 
MK during transition. The military played midwife to the birth of the democratic 
South Africa and ensured this to be a relatively bloodless process. In short, the 
success of South Africa's transition was paid for by the Strategic Arms Package. 
Therefore, keeping the military at bay often comes with a heavy price tag. In South 
Africa that price tag might exceed R90 billion rand in six years. Such expenditure 
would seem risky in a developing state. But what is clear is that the South African 
economy, although widely considered as under-developed, remains strong and stable 
enough to absorb this expenditure. 
Strategic arms acquisitions oil the machinery of state by providing stability. The SAP 
was filled with empowerment deals aimed at obtaining buy-in from the elite to ensure 











when business meets politics. Democratic governments need to buy influence within 
business and business needs to buy influence within politics. This is characteristic of 
modern democracy. In South Africa the SAP shows that transparency and 
accountability Transparency and accountability might very well be casualties in this 
process, but stability within democracy seems to endure provided that the perception 
of legitimacy remains intact. 
6.4.2 Legislative control over the military in a democracy 
The debate within civil-military relations literature about legislative control over the 
military is in idealized terms. 
Executive dominance over the legislature is a phenomenon present in democracies 
around the world. Executives enjoy greater access to resources than legislatures and 
tend to have more expertise in matters relating to defence. The emergence of 
technocrats within government has only widened this gap. Arms embargoes and other 
sanctions exacerbate this situation by further weakening legislatures importance, 
whilst strengthening executives' relative position. 
What is clear is that legislatures in constitutional democracies, characterized by a 
strict separation of powers, have greater success in exercising control over the military 
budget and expenditure. Legislatures in parliamentary democracies enjoy more 
success in controlling deployment of the military, but struggle to exercise control over 
military budgets. This is due to the majority held by governments within both the 
executive and the legislature. This situation severely limits a parliamentary 
democracy's legislature to check the executive's dominance within matters relating to 
the military. 
6.4.3 Legislative control over the military in democratic South Africa 
Legislative control over the military consists of several things. However, three things 
stand out as the most important. First, legislatures must control all defence legislation 
and policy. Second, legislatures must have the sole authority to make declarations of 
war and approve deployment of the military. Third, legislatures must control/approve 
the military's budgets. The latter is the most effective way that legislatures can 











legislation, budgets and deployment, is the key cog in the machine of legislative 
control over the military. Legislative oversight lends weight to legislative control over 
the military. The South African Parliament enjoys all of these powers. They are 
formally institutionalized within the Constitution, which is the highest authority 
within the state. However, legislative control over the military in South Africa 
remains weak. 
There is a tradition from the Apartheid era of weak oversight over the military within 
the South African Parliament. Although Parliament has formal powers of control, the 
transition to democracy in 1994 has not changed the tradition of weak oversight. 
Indeed, greater formal legislative control over the military exists in post-Apartheid 
South Africa, but legislative oversight over the military and the executive remains 
weak. Thus, these extensive powers are severely diluted by Parliament's inability to 
hold the executive and the military to account. 
Parliament also suffers from a lack of expertise in defence issues. MPs are either too 
inexperienced or do not possess the necessary expertise with which to match the 
executive and especially the military. Moreover, Parliament has an inadequate 
research capacity with which to plug this gap in expertise over defence issues. 
Furthermore, strict party discipline ensures that MPs of the ruling party do not 
exercise robust oversight as is seen in the case of Congressional and Senate 
committees of the United States. The majority held by the ruling party, both within 
Parliament and the executive, ensures that MPs regard themselves as party members 
first, and elected officials second. 
Executive dominance is another tradition from the Apartheid era that has continued. 
Indeed, this is a far cry from the imperial presidency experienced under Total 
Strategy. However, what remains similar is that the executive dominates the 
legislature. One-party dominance has seen power centralized within the executive and 
Parliament is unable to check this dominance. 
South Africa's democratic institutions are vulnerable to economic pressure. Under 











executive. The Arms Deal shows that this is still so. The SAP provided opportunities 
for grand corruption and made South Africa's institutions vulnerable to foreign and 
domestic business interests. In other words, the SAP shows that business will buy 
influence within politics and vice versa. This undermines institutions and legislative 
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